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ABSTRACT 
This article is a plea for changes in the scholarly dialogue about 
“evergreening” by drug companies. Allegations that drug companies 
engage in “evergreening” are pervasive in legal scholarship, economic 
scholarship, medical and health policy scholarship, and policy writing, 
and they have prompted significant policymaking proposals. This Article 
was motivated by concern that the metaphor has not been fully explained 
and that policymaking in response might therefore be premature. It 
canvasses and assesses the scholarly literature—more than 300 articles—
discussing or mentioning “evergreening.” It catalogues the definitions, 
the examples, and the empirical studies. Scholars use the term when 
describing certain actions taken by the innovative companies that develop 
and introduce new medicines to market. But they are inconsistent in their 
descriptions of the circumstances to which the term applies. And though 
most claim the innovator has “extended” something in these 
circumstances, they do not agree on the particulars. The literature is 
similarly in disarray about what has been “evergreened”—an invention, 
a product, a price, a patent, or something else entirely. All of this makes 
it hard to know from the literature what exactly scholars are writing 
about. After sorting through the definitions and examples—and 
considering the legal framework and practical landscape in which drug 
innovators and their generic competitors operate—this Article offers an 
answer and, more importantly, identifies the implicit normative claim. In 
simple terms, the normative claim in the literature is something like this: 
“an innovator should not enjoy an exclusive market and supra-
competitive pricing for innovations that stem in some fashion from a 
separate innovation for which it already enjoyed a 20-year patent term. 
Or at least, a drug innovator should not.” This Article does not defend, or 
reject, this normative claim. Instead, it makes a different claim: that 
policymaking should be based on descriptive scholarship that is careful 
and precise about the relevant law and facts, normative work that is clear 
and candid about its claim and thorough in its reasoning, and empirical 
studies that document the actual problem the normative proposals and 
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policymaking proposals are meant to address. Significant policymaking 
would be premature today, because we have not yet produced this body of 
work. Constant use of the “evergreening” metaphor may be obscuring 
this failure. The Article concludes with recommendations for scholars 
continuing to work on these topics, focusing on ways that we can provide 
quality work to assist policymakers considering the normative claim. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Allegations that drug companies engage in “evergreening” pervade 
legal scholarship, economic scholarship, medical and health policy 
scholarship, and policy writing.1 English language dictionaries tell us that 
the primary meaning of “evergreen” is literal; unlike a deciduous tree, an 
evergreen tree or shrub has green foliage all year round.2 An evergreen 
leaf lasts from one season to the next.3 Even when the term does not refer 
to non-deciduous plants, its primary meaning is literal; an evergreen 
landscape is always green.4 But the term also has a figurative meaning.5 
Something is “evergreen” if it is “always fresh” or “never failing” or 
“enduring.”6 
In the literature relating to drug companies, the term “evergreening” 
is a metaphor. The writer invokes a concrete image familiar to the 
audience to convey an abstract concept relating to legal and factual 
circumstances in the real world.7 Metaphors are common in legal writing 
and especially common in intellectual property writing.8 They are 
powerful because they turn the complex and unfamiliar into something 
simple and familiar, and sometimes they are also powerful because they 
1. See infra Part III.
2. Evergreen, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, at 1, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/evergreen [https://perma.cc/Z2ST-7HEB]; see also Evergreen, OXFORD 
ENGLISH DICTIONARY [hereinafter OED], https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/
65314?redirectedFrom=evergreen#eid [https://perma.cc/JF9T-NYDQ]; Evergreen, THE AMERICAN
HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, https://ahdictionary.com/word/
search.html?q=evergreen [https://perma.cc/YP2T-VJDP]. 
3. Evergreen, OED, supra note 2, at 1b. 
4. Id. at 2a. 
5. Evergreen, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, supra note 2, at 2a (defining “figurative” as “expressing 
one thing in terms normally denoting another with which it may be regarded as analogous”). 
6. Evergreen, OED, supra note 2, at 2b; Evergreen, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, supra note 2, at 2a 
(“retaining freshness or interest”), 2b (“universally and continually relevant”); Evergreen, AMERICAN 
HERITAGE, supra note 2, at 3 (“automatically renewed or repeatedly made valid”). 
7. See Jacob Carpenter, Persuading with Precedent: Understanding and Improving Analogies 
in Legal Argument, 44 CAP. U.L. REV. 461, 464 (2016) (explaining how metaphors work in legal 
argument). 
8. Brian L. Frye, IP as Metaphor, 18 CHAP. L. REV. 735, 736 (2015) (“[T]he rhetoric of
intellectual property is metaphorical.”). 
3
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trigger emotional responses that fill gaps left open by the writer.9 For these 
reasons, metaphors can be dangerous in legal writing.10 Though 
sometimes helpful in advancing understanding, they are not literally true, 
and the implicit analogy is rarely (if ever) a perfect fit.11 The gap-filling 
that audiences instinctively perform is no substitute for reasoning from 
solid evidence. Metaphors can lead both author and audience to error.12 
Despite these reasons for caution, the metaphor of “evergreening” by 
drug companies has crept into the popular press, court filings and 
decisions, and policymaking discussions.13 And policymakers have been 
considering proposals to make significant changes to antitrust law, 
intellectual property law, and the regulatory framework governing new 
medicines in response to allegations of “evergreening.”14 
This Article was motivated by concern that the metaphor has not 
been fully explained and that policymaking in response to the metaphor 
might therefore be premature. It canvasses and assesses the scholarly 
literature—342 articles in legal, medical and scientific, and economic 
journals—that discusses or references “evergreening.”15 It explains that 
scholars use the term when describing certain actions taken by the 
companies that develop and introduce new medicines to market 
(“innovators”).16 For example, some use the term when a company 
introduces its medicine first in an immediate release form and later in an 
extended release form (which can be taken less often) if the new form has 
a patent expiring later than the patent covering the active ingredient.17 In 
addition to examples, the literature includes empirical studies—for 
9. E.g., id. at 742 (noting use of “agrarian metaphors to describe intellectual property owners”
and “criminal metaphors to describe intellectual property infringers”); id. at 744–51 (discussing use 
of “troll” metaphor in intellectual property law). See also Carpenter, supra note 7, at 476; Margaret 
M. Blair, On Models, Metaphors, Rhetoric, and the Law, 41 TULSA L. REV. 513, 513 (2006). 
10. E.g., Michael R. Smith, Levels of Metaphor in Persuasive Legal Writing, 58 MERCER L.
REV. 919, 923 (2007). 
11. Blair, supra note 9, at 513. 
12. Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926) (noting the risk with metaphors, 
that despite “starting as devices to liberate thought, they end often by enslaving it”). 
13. See authorities cited infra note 122. 
14. E.g., Affordable Prescriptions for Patients Act of 2019, S.1416, 116th Cong. § 27(b)(1) 
(introduced May 9, 2019) (proposing to presume it an “unfair method of competition in or affecting 
commerce” to obtain certain additional later-expiring patents in the same patent family or portfolio 
as an already issued patent that claims an approved drug). 
15. This is not all academic articles published in the United States that use the term
“evergreening” in connection with drugs. But it includes 313 articles in academic law journals (or 
comparable legal publications), which are virtually all legal scholarship, excluding books. 
16. Some call these companies “brand” companies, because their products usually bear brand 
names. 
17. See infra Part III.A.
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instance, showing that innovators introduce a variety of related products, 
and that later-introduced products are often protected by later-expiring 
intellectual property.18 The literature also treats “evergreening” as bad; 
scholars using the term generally criticize the actions.19 
The actions at issue in this scholarship take place within a complex 
landscape of federal and state laws governing regulatory approval of new 
medicines, intellectual property, and healthcare professionals (doctors and 
pharmacists), and each example is burdened with unique factual 
circumstances (such as the response of patients and payers to clinical and 
economic factors specific to that medicine).20 The articles tend not to 
consider or describe the nuances of this landscape, however, even when 
offering specific examples. Scholars are also inconsistent in their 
descriptions of the circumstances to which the label (the metaphor) 
applies.21 And though most claim the innovator has “extended” something 
in these circumstances, they do not agree on the particulars.22 The 
literature is similarly in disarray about what has been “evergreened”—an 
invention, a product, a price, a patent, or something else entirely.23 All of 
18. See infra Part III.C.
19. See infra Part III.A. Exceptions are rare. But see Jonathan J. Darrow, Debunking the
“Evergreening” Patents Myth, 131 HARV. L. REC., December 8, 2010, at 6 (arguing that 
characterizations of “evergreening” have “little basis in United States patent law and perpetuate the 
myth that patents can be ‘extended’ by minor modifications to existing products”); Christopher M. 
Holman, In Defense of Secondary Pharmaceutical Patents: A Response to the UN’s Guidelines for 
Pharmaceutical Patent Examination, 50 IND. L. REV. 759, 776–77 (2017) (discussing a U.K. court 
decision noting that “the patent on escitalopram did not prevent a number of manufacturers from 
selling generic versions of” Cipralex, and adding that this is “yet another example illustrating the 
fallacy of the premise that patents on enantiomers somehow provide ‘evergreened’ protection for 
products whose patents have expired”); Emily Michiko Morris, Much Ado About the TPP’s Effect on 
Pharmaceuticals, 20 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 135, 142–43 (2017) (noting that “sequential patents 
on new uses are . . . separate patents that must satisfy all of the same patentability requirements that 
active ingredient patents must satisfy,” that a patent on a new use is “much narrower in scope” than a 
patent on the active ingredient, and that once the patent on the active ingredient expires, “it can be 
freely used for any unpatented use, including the use for which it was originally patented”); Emily 
Michiko Morris, The Myth of Generic Pharmaceutical Competition Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, 
22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 245, 260 (2012) (stating that there is “plenty of reason 
to doubt that such sequential innovation patents are nearly as suspect as the critics would make out”); 
see also Dorothy Du, Novartis AG v. Union of India: “Evergreening,” TRIPs, and “Enhanced 
Efficacy” Under Section 3(d), 21 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 223, 240 (2014) (noting that some call it 
evergreening when a company patents “a new commercial embodiment of a drug” that is “no better 
than the original commercial embodiment,” but arguing that this theory “lacks merit” because if the 
second version were no better, consumers would demand the first version). 
20. See infra Part III.A.
21. See infra Part III.A.
22. See infra Part III.A.
23. See infra Part III.A.
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this makes it hard to know from the literature what exactly scholars are 
writing about. 
There is, in other words, an ontological problem in the literature. 
Locating the extension—the “evergreening”—the thing about which 
scholars are writing—is a challenge. These situations never involve 
extension of patents or an extension of the company’s proprietary rights 
in its research data, which would be legally impossible.24 No matter what 
sorts of new products an innovator patents and launches, once the patent 
on an active ingredient expires, a generic company can use the ingredient 
in its own product and obtain approval relying on the research the 
innovator performed.25 To give a concrete example, though the U.S. Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA) may approve the innovator’s new dosage 
form, this approval does not prevent a generic company from copying the 
innovator’s old dosage form. No barriers prevent this generic company 
from promoting its competing product to doctors, payers, and patients.26 
No barriers prevent payers from requiring that their insured patients use 
the generic company’s product.27 
The question then, is this: what—precisely—has been extended in 
the scenarios that scholars call “evergreening”? What does 
“evergreening” mean? 
After sorting through the definitions and examples in the literature—
and considering the legal framework and practical landscape in which 
innovators and generic companies operate—this Article offers an answer. 
The wildly varying circumstances described are similar in one respect: 
The innovator is able to market at least some drug products that would not 
exist but for its initial active ingredient discovery, without generic copies 
of these products in the market, and thus perhaps with supra-competitive 
pricing, and it can market these products after expiration of the patent on 
the active ingredient itself. To call this an “extension” is puzzling, 
however, because no law provides a basis for stating a time limit on the 
innovator’s ability to do so. And to say that this is wrong, that this should 
not be so, is a normative claim. Restated, the normative claim would be 
something like this: an innovator should not enjoy an exclusive market 
and supra-competitive pricing for innovations that stem in some fashion 
from a separate innovation for which it already enjoyed a 20-year patent 
term. Or at least, a drug innovator should not. 
24. See infra Part IV.A.
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This Article does not take up this normative claim. Instead, this 
Article focuses on a different claim: that policymaking should be based 
on descriptive scholarship that is careful and precise about the relevant 
law and facts, normative work that is clear and candid about its claim and 
thorough in its reasoning, and empirical studies that document the actual 
problem the normative proposals and policymaking proposals are meant 
to address. Significant policymaking would be premature today because 
we have not yet produced this scholarship. Rampant use of the 
“evergreening” metaphor is obscuring this failure. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II describes the federal and 
state legal landscape that governs regulatory approval, promotion, 
prescribing, and dispensing of new medicines (including generic 
medicines) as well as the intellectual property available. It focuses on 
aspects of this landscape that non-specialist readers of the evergreening 
literature may not appreciate. Part III catalogues definitions of 
“evergreening” in the scholarly literature as well as examples offered by 
scholars and empirical studies in that literature. Part IV considers the 
definitions, examples, and studies in context, identifying the “extension” 
apparently at issue and thus the underlying normative claim. Part V, which 
also serves as a conclusion, provides recommendations for scholars 
continuing to work on these topics, focusing on ways that we can provide 
quality work to assist policymakers considering the normative claim. 
II. THE CONTEXT FOR “EVERGREENING” ALLEGATIONS
The events that trigger the “evergreening” label occur at the 
intersection of several bodies of law: the federal framework requiring 
premarket approval of new medicines and their copies, federal intellectual 
property laws, federal and state laws governing promotion of medicines, 
and federal laws and practices and state laws relating to prescribing and 
dispensing of medicines. Certain basic points about these intersecting 
frameworks are well understood. New medicines require premarket 
testing and approval from FDA.28 When they are first launched, they tend 
to be sold under brand names and protected by patents. These patents, 
combined with statutory rights in the testing data, delay the approval of 
cheaper copies.29 Eventually FDA approves cheaper copies, which 
pharmacists usually dispense automatically, even when doctors prescribe 
the branded product by name.30 As this Part explains, however, despite 
28. See infra Part II.A.
29. See infra Part II.B.
30. See infra Part II.C.
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these simple truths, the landscape is more complex and nuanced. FDA 
approves specific drug products, rather than new medicines in some 
abstract sense. A generic drug company copies a specific product, and it 
must contend with the patents relevant to that product—not other patents 
the innovator might hold. And it need not market a perfect copy. Thus, a 
generic company has some freedom to operate. Finally, although 
conventional wisdom holds that generic companies depend on automatic 
pharmacy substitution to obtain market share, the truth may be more 
complicated. 
A. Approval of Medicines 
Federal law requires that every “new drug” be approved by FDA 
before it is introduced to the market.31 Both innovative (branded) drugs 
and generic drugs require preapproval. For an innovative drug, the 
applicant submits either a new drug application (NDA) or a biologics 
license application (BLA), depending on whether the product—as a 
practical matter, whether its active ingredient—is biological.32 The active 
ingredient is the component meant to furnish the medicine’s effect, such 
as treatment of a particular disease.33 FDA also calls the active ingredient 
a “drug substance.”34 Most scholarship that discusses “evergreening” 
focuses on non-biological drugs, and this Article takes the same 
approach.35 
31. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2018). “Drugs” include items intended for use in diagnosis, cure,
mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, as well as items (other than food) intended to affect 
the structure or function of the body. 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1) (2018). Subject to caveats not relevant 
here, “new drugs,” which require preapproval, are “drugs” “not generally recognized . . . as safe and 
effective for use under the conditions described . . . in th[eir] labeling.” 21 U.S.C. § 321(p)(1) (2018). 
32. A “‘biological product’ [is] a virus, therapeutic serum, toxin, antitoxin, vaccine, blood,
blood component or derivative, allergenic product, protein . . . , or analogous product, or 
arsphenamine or derivative of arsphenamine . . . applicable to the prevention, treatment or cure of a 
disease or condition [in] human beings.” 42 U.S.C. § 262(i) (2018). 
33. 21 C.F.R. § 314.3(b) (2020) (“Active ingredient is any component that is intended to 
furnish pharmacological activity or other direct effect in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or 
prevention of disease, or to affect the structure or any function of the body of man or other animals.”). 
34. Id. § 314.3(b) (2020) (“Drug substance is an active ingredient that is intended to furnish
pharmacological activity or other direct effect in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or 
prevention of disease or to affect the structure or any function of the human body, but does not include 
intermediates used in the synthesis of such ingredient.”). 
35. Most allegations of “evergreening” ultimately relate to an innovator’s position in the
market and potential competition from generic drugs, which are approved under a 1984 statute. Drug 
Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585. 
Innovative biological products face competition instead from biosimilar biologics and 
interchangeable biologics licensed under a statutory provision that is barely a decade old. Biologics 
Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119. 
8
Akron Law Review, Vol. 53 [2019], Iss. 4, Art. 2
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol53/iss4/2
2019] THE “EVERGREENING” METAPHOR 813 
Although each “new drug” requires an approved application, FDA 
approves drug products.36 A drug product is a medicine in its finished 
form, meaning the form that will be sold in the market and administered 
to patients.37 The marketing application describes the composition, 
manufacturing process, and specifications of both the drug substance 
(active ingredient) and this final drug product.38 It also includes 
laboratory, animal (preclinical), and human (clinical) testing data showing 
that this product is safe and effective.39 FDA approves the product 
described in the application—the specific formulation (of active and 
inactive ingredients40), in a particular dosage form (such as capsule or 
tablet), for a particular route of administration, at a particular strength, for 
particular medical uses (also known as the product’s “indications”), 
manufactured as described in the application, and accompanied by 
labeling written for prescribers based on the data in the application.41 
FDA then adds the product to a publicly available list of products 
approved based on safety and effectiveness.42 This publication, known as 
the ORANGE BOOK, lists specific drug products approved by FDA.43 For 
instance, it lists Eli Lilly’s 5 mg tablets of Zyprexa (olanzapine) intended 
for oral administration, approved under NDA 20592 on September 30, 
1996, separately from other products containing olanzapine marketed by 
the same company and others.44 
Because FDA approval is specific to the product proposed in a 
particular application, a company that wants to change its product—to 
market something not covered by the approved application—must seek 
36. Premarket approval is required if the product is new, even if the active ingredient has been 
marketed in the past. See generally United States v. Generix Drug Corp., 460 U.S. 453, 459 (1983) 
(holding that a generic drug product is a “drug” and a “new drug” even if the active ingredient has 
been marketed previously). 
37. 21 C.F.R. § 314.3(b) (2020) (“Drug product is a finished dosage form, e.g., tablet, capsule,
or solution, that contains a drug substance, generally, but not necessarily, in association with one or 
more other ingredients.”). 
38. 21 C.F.R. § 314.50 (2020) (describing content and format of a new drug application). 
39. 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(b), (e) (2018); see generally Erika Lietzan, The Drug Innovation
Paradox, 83 MO. L. REV. 39, 49–56 (2018) (describing the new drug research and development 
process). 
40. An “[i]nactive ingredient is any component other than the active ingredient” and might
include an excipient, preservative, solvent, buffer, or coating, among other things. 21 C.F.R. § 314.3 
(2020). 
41. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2018); see also 21 C.F.R. § 314.70 (2020) (requiring approval of a
supplemental application if changes are made to any conditions established in the approved 
application). 
42. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(7) (2018). 
43. FDA, APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS WITH THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS 
(40th ed. 2020) [hereinafter “ORANGE BOOK”]. 
44. Id. at 3-325–3-327. 
9
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FDA approval again.45 Depending on the nature of the change, the 
company might need preapproval or it might be allowed to make the 
change and seek approval at the same time.46 For example, if it wants to 
market a new strength of the product or add a new use to the labeling, it 
must get preapproval.47 Also depending on the nature of the change, it 
might need to file a separate marketing application, or it might be allowed 
to file a “supplement” to its existing application.48 
Although FDA may not approve new drugs without proof of safety 
and effectiveness, in some cases an applicant need not perform all the 
research itself. Federal law permits the submission of “abbreviated” 
marketing applications referencing drugs listed in the ORANGE BOOK as 
approved based on safety and effectiveness.49 An abbreviated application 
contains data sufficient to create a scientific bridge to the listed drug and 
then relies on the safety and effectiveness data in the application that 
covered the listed drug.50 The earlier-approved product is known as the 
new product’s “reference” listed drug. 
The statute permits two types of abbreviated applications. First, a 
company may submit an “abbreviated new drug application” (ANDA) for 
a drug that essentially duplicates the reference drug.51 This is also known 
as a “generic” drug application, and the duplicate is known as a “generic” 
drug. Ordinarily, the company shows that its generic drug has the same 
active ingredient, route of administration, dosage form, strength, and 
labeling as the reference drug.52 The generic drug does not have to have 
the same formulation. It must be “bioequivalent” to the listed drug 
45. 21 C.F.R. § 314.70 (2020) (governing changes to an approved NDA); id. § 314.97 
(governing changes to an approved ANDA). 
46. Compare 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(b) (2020) (changes requiring preapproval) with 
id. § 314.70(c) (2020) (changes requiring supplement submission 30 days before distribution). Some 
minor changes can be described in the company’s annual report to FDA. id. § 314.70(d) (2020). 
47. 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(b) (2020). 
48. See generally FDA, SUBMITTING SEPARATE MARKETING APPLICATIONS AND CLINICAL 
DATA FOR PURPOSES OF ASSESSING USER FEES: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY (Dec. 2004) [hereinafter 
“SEPARATE APPLICATIONS GUIDANCE”], https://www.fda.gov/regulatory-information/search-fda-
guidance-documents/submitting-separate-marketing-applications-and-clinical-data-purposes-
assessing-user-fees [https://perma.cc/R3M5-WUPZ]. 
49. 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(b)(2), (j) (2018). 
50. E.g., DETERMINING WHETHER TO SUBMIT AN ANDA OR A 505(B)(2) APPLICATION 4, 
FDA, May 2019, https://www.fda.gov/regulatory-information/search-fda-guidance-
documents/determining-whether-submit-anda-or-505b2-application [https://perma.cc/STF5-JJ83] 
(“The [505(b)(2)] applicant is expected to establish a bridge (e.g., by using comparative 
bioavailability data) between the proposed drug product and each listed drug that the applicant seeks 
to rely upon to demonstrate that reliance on the listed drug is scientifically justified.”). 
51. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2) (2018). 
52. Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iii) (2018); id. §§ 314.94(a)(5)–(6) (2020). 
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however, meaning that its active ingredient must reach the site of action 
in the body to the same extent and at the same rate as the active ingredient 
of the listed drug.53 An ANDA is much smaller than an innovator’s full 
application: cheaper and faster to prepare, with comparatively few data.54 
A generic drug proposed in an ANDA does not have to be a perfect 
copy. If the generic company wants to change the route of administration, 
dosage form, or strength (for instance, to avoid patent infringement) and 
still submit an ANDA, it may ask FDA’s permission by filing a 
“suitability” petition.55 FDA must approve this petition unless it decides 
more safety and effectiveness data are needed.56 If FDA approves the 
petition, the generic company may submit an ANDA.57 FDA holds this 
“petitioned ANDA” to the same standard as any other ANDA, with two 
exceptions. The labeling of the generic drug will be different to reflect the 
changes made.58 And if the generic company cannot show its drug’s 
bioequivalence, it may show that its drug “can be expected to have the 
same therapeutic effect as the [reference] listed drug” for each condition 
of use proposed for its labeling.59 
Second, a company may submit an abbreviated application that 
proposes differences from the listed product, such as modifications to 
avoid a patent or innovations that the company believes will be 
competitive in the market. This application is called a “505(b)(2) 
application,” after the provision of law in which it appears.60 Although the 
changes must be supported by new safety and effectiveness data, the 
generic company will otherwise rely on the innovator’s research. This 
Article distinguishes between generic applications (ANDAs) and 
505(b)(2) applications when the distinctions are relevant, and refers to 
them collectively as “abbreviated applications” when the distinctions are 
not. For simplicity’s sake, it calls the applicants “generic companies” 
regardless of the type of abbreviated application at issue. In any case, the 
53. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(8)(B) (2018). 
54. Erika Lietzan, The Myths of Data Exclusivity, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 91, 106–08 
(2016). 
55. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(C) (2018). 
56. Id. 
57. Id. § 355(j)(2)(A).
58. Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(v).
59. Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv); 21 C.F.R. § 314.93 (2020). 
60. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2) (2018); APPLICATIONS COVERED BY SECTION 505(B)(2), FDA, Dec. 
1999, https://www.fda.gov/regulatory-information/search-fda-guidance-documents/applications-
covered-section-505b2 [https://perma.cc/JXQ6-S3UH]. A company may use the 505(b)(2) for other 
reasons, as well, such as when FDA rejects is suitability petition because clinical data are needed, or 
when it cannot satisfy the “sameness” standard due to the product’s complexity. Id. 
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distinction between generic companies and innovator companies is 
artificial, in; any company may submit either type of application. 
B. Intellectual Property Considerations 
After approval of a reference listed drug, federal law ensures the 
innovator a period before the submission and approval of abbreviated 
applications citing its drug. This period stems from patents the innovator 
owns as well as the innovator’s statutory “exclusivity” in its research 
data.61 It may also stem from other statutory exclusivity provisions in 
federal law.62 Whether a particular patent or statutory exclusivity affects 
a particular generic company’s particular product depends on its scope as 
well as on what the generic company proposes and when it proposes to 
market its product. 
1. Statutory Exclusivity
If the innovator’s product contained a new active moiety (not 
approved before), the drug statute temporarily protects the innovator’s 
exclusivity in its research data by specifying a point in the future after 
which generic companies may rely on the data in their abbreviated 
applications.63 No company may submit an abbreviated application citing 
a listed drug containing a new chemical entity (active moiety) until five 
years after first approval of the new chemical entity.64 The period before 
that date is known as “new chemical entity” data exclusivity. This period 
drops to four years if the generic company claims it has avoided—or 
challenges (as invalid)—a patent claiming the listed drug or an approved 
61. For simplicity, this Article calls the innovator the “owner” of any patent it owns or
exclusively licenses. 
62. Other intellectual property laws, including state trade secret law and federal trademark law, 
may also protect the innovator’s position in the market. This Article focuses on the role of patents and 
statutory exclusivity, because they play a direct role in the timing of submission and approval of 
abbreviated applications. 
63. See generally Lietzan, supra note 54, at 117–18. The active moiety is the molecule
responsible for the physiological or pharmacological action of the drug. 21 C.F.R. § 314.108 (2020). 
It may differ from the active ingredient, the substance before its introduction to the body. 
21 C.F.R. § 314.3 (2020). 
64. The statute refers to a new “active ingredient.” 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(3)(E)(ii) (2018)
(applicable to 505(b)(2) applications); id. § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii) (applicable to ANDAs). See Lietzan, 
supra note 54, at 135 (explaining FDA’s adopting the term “new chemical entity” and its further 
elaboration that this refers to a new “active moiety”). 
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method of using the listed drug.65 The next subpart describes these 
challenges. 
If the innovator’s product has no new chemical entity, but clinical 
data (other than bioavailability data) were necessary to secure its 
approval, FDA cannot approve an abbreviated application for the same 
active moiety for the same conditions of approval for three years.66 For 
example, if a company developed a new treatment for breast cancer using 
an older active moiety that FDA approved decades ago (for another 
company), it would file a new drug application—probably a 505(b)(2) 
application—and receive three years of exclusivity. Or if a company 
developed a new chemical entity that would be administered through 
intravenous infusion, and it later found a way to administer the treatment 
(for the same disease) by capsule, it would generally file a new application 
and ordinarily receive three years of exclusivity on the new product. 
Three-year exclusivity operates differently from new-chemical-entity 
exclusivity because it prevents approval (rather than submission) of other 
applications, and it prevents approval only if those applications propose 
the same active moiety for the same condition of approval. 
2. Patent-Based Statutory Exclusivity
Federal law allows a patent to issue for any new, useful, non-obvious 
invention.67 For any particular drug product approved by FDA, the 
innovator might own patents on several discrete inventions.68 These 
usually include the product’s active ingredient.69 They might include the 
65. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(3)(E)(ii) (2018) (applicable to 505(b)(2) applications); id. 
§ 355(j)(5)(F)(ii) (applicable to ANDAs).
66. 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(b)(3)(E)(iii)–(iv), 355(j)(5)(F)(iii)–(iv) (2018); see also Letter from
Sharon Hertz, Dir. Div. of Anesthesiology, Addiction Med. & Pain Med., to Mike Derkacz, President 
& CEO, Braeburn, Inc., Re: NDA 210136 (Nov. 6, 2019), https://www.lassmanfdalaw.com/wp-
content/uploads/sites/217/2019/11/FDA-Remand-Decision-11-7-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/3HW2-
5FBZ] (describing FDA’s interpretation of 3-year exclusivity). Bioavailability studies measure the 
rate and extent to which the active ingredient or therapeutic ingredient becomes available at the site 
of action in the body. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(8)(A)(ii) (2018). 
67. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103 (2018). Various other conditions must be satisfied for a patent 
to issue. E.g., 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2018) (written description requirement). 
68. See generally John R. Thomas, PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT LAW 46–64 (3d ed. 2015)
(listing various types of pharmaceutical patent claims). Drug products are not unique in this regard. 
E.g., Masataka Kai, Science and Engineering Technology Behind Bridgestone Tour Gold Balls, 1 
SPORTS TECH. 57, 58 (2008) (noting “twenty-five or more patents” relevant to the Bridgestone Tour 
B330 golf ball). 
69. See Thomas, supra note 68, at 47. A study of “new molecular entities” approved between
1988 and 2005 found, however, that only 64% had chemical compound patents. Amy Kapczynski et 
al., Polymorphs and Prodrugs and Salts (Oh My!): An Empirical Analysis of “Secondary” 
Pharmaceutical Patents, 7 PLOS ONLINE 12, Dec. 5, 2012, at 4. A “new molecular entity” is an active 
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product’s formulation, or a dosage form and dosage of the active 
ingredient (or formulation).70 Other possibilities include a method of 
using or administering the product, the manufacturing process, and a 
metabolite of the active ingredient.71 A patent lasts for 20 years from its 
application date,72 and generally an innovator files its active ingredient 
patent first, making it the first to expire.73 Other inventions (formulation, 
dosage form, and so on) may emerge later, during premarket 
development. If the resulting patent applications refer to the active 
ingredient patent, the patents will expire when the active ingredient patent 
expires, but if not, they will expire later.74 
The drug statute links the timing of FDA approval of an abbreviated 
application to the patents claiming the reference listed drug, as follows. 
In its new drug application, the innovator lists the patents that claim 
its ingredient, product (formulation and composition), and methods of use 
for which it seeks approval.75 Once FDA approves its product, the 
innovator finalizes the list, and FDA publishes the patents and their expiry 
dates in the ORANGE BOOK.76 If any patents issuing after this time also 
satisfy the listing standard (by claiming the drug or an approved method 
of using the drug), the innovator has 30 days to notify FDA, which adds 
them to the ORANGE BOOK.77 
Whether it files an ANDA or a 505(b)(2) application, a generic 
company must address these patents in its application.78 For each 
unexpired patent listed in the ORANGE BOOK for the specific drug on 
ingredient that contains no active moiety approved before or previously marketed in the United States. 
See FDA, NDA Classification Codes, MAPP 5018.2 (Nov. 4, 2016). 
70. See Thomas, supra note 68, at 47–48; see also 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(b) (2020). 
71. Thomas, supra note 68, at 48–50, 53–55; 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(b) (2020). 
72. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2018). If the patent relates to an earlier-filed patent, it lasts for 20
years from the earlier patent’s application date. Id. 
73. Morris, Myth, supra note 19, at 273–74. 
74. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2018). 
75. The statute requires the innovator to file any patent that claims “the drug . . . or a method 
of using such drug and with respect to which a claim of patent infringement could reasonably be 
asserted if a person not licensed by the owner engaged in the manufacture, use, or sale of the drug.” 
21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2018); see 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(b) (2020) (defining this to mean patents 
claiming the active ingredient, product, and method of use, but not method of manufacturing); see 
also 54 Fed. Reg. 28872, 28918 (July 19, 1989). 
76. Patent and Exclusivity Information Addendum, ORANGE BOOK, supra note 43, at AD1–
AD277. 
77. 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(2) (2018). 
78. Id. §§ 355(b)(2)(A), 355(j)(2)(A)(vii). Technically, the generic company must address
every patent that claims the reference drug or a use for which it seeks approval, whether or not the 
patent is listed in the ORANGE BOOK. This is why one option, for the generic company, is to say that 
the patent information “has not been filed” by the innovator. Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(I). 
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which it relies, the generic company has two choices. Its selection dictates 
the timing of FDA approval as far as that patent is concerned, as follows. 
First, the generic company may state the date on which the patent 
will expire, signifying that it does not plan to market its drug before patent 
expiry.79 This is called a “paragraph III” certification after the statutory 
provision that describes it. FDA reviews the submitted application, but 
even if the drug approval standard is satisfied, FDA cannot grant final 
approval until patent expiry.80 Second, the generic company may assert 
that the patent is invalid or will not be infringed by its drug, in which case 
it must notify the innovator of its position.81 This is called a “paragraph 
IV” certification after the statutory provision that describes it. FDA may 
grant final approval immediately if the approval standard is met, unless 
the innovator sues within 45 days of receiving notice from the generic 
company.82 If the innovator sues within 45 days, the statute stays final 
approval of the abbreviated application for 30 months.83 The stay applies 
only if the innovator had listed the patent before the generic company 
submitted its abbreviated application.84 At the end of the 30 months, FDA 
must approve the abbreviated application if the approval standard is met, 
even if the patent litigation is ongoing.85 If the generic company launches 
at this point, it does so at the risk of losing when the litigation concludes 
and, in that scenario, possibly owing damages to the innovator. 
79. Id. §§ 355(b)(2)(A)(iii), 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(III).
80. Id. §§ 355(c)(3)(B), 355(j)(5)(B)(ii). 
81. Id. §§ 355(b)(3)(A), 355(j)(2)(B)(i). 
82. Id. §§ 355(c)(3)(C), 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). 
83. Id. §§ 355(c)(3)(C), 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). If the generic company submitted its application
during the fourth year of the innovator’s five-year new-chemical-entity exclusivity term, though, the 
30-month stay is extended so that it expires 7.5 years after approval of the innovator’s application. 
Id. §§ 355(c)(3)(E)(ii), 355(j)(5)(F)(ii) (2018). 
84. Id. §§ 355(c)(3)(C) (2018) (applying certification only if the patent was listed “before the
date on which the” abbreviated application was submitted); id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (same). This was 
not always the case. Before December 8, 2003, a new paragraph IV certification after ANDA 
submission triggered a new 45-day notice window, and any resulting litigation triggered a new 30-
month stay. Congress changed the law in 2003. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and 
Modernization Act of 2003, Title XI, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003). 
85. There are some exceptions. A statutory exclusivity term (such as seven-year orphan
exclusivity) associated with initial approval of the innovator’s drug might still be running at the end 
of the 30-month stay and delay approval until its expiry. And the first generic company to submit a 
paragraph IV certification in an ANDA citing the listed drug is eligible for 180-day exclusivity, 
which—if awarded—blocks approval of subsequent ANDAs also containing paragraph IV 
certifications. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2020). Thus, when a 30-month stay of ANDA approval 
expires, FDA will not approve the ANDA if another company is eligible for 180-day exclusivity and 
the exclusivity has not concluded (or been forfeit). See generally Erika Lietzan & Julia Post, The Law 
of 180-Day Exclusivity, 71 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 327 (2016). 
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In the end, the court’s ruling will control. If the generic company 
wins in trial court while the stay is in place (if it establishes that its product 
is non-infringing or that the patent is invalid), FDA must approve its 
application on the day the court enters judgment (assuming the application 
is otherwise ready for approval).86 If the generic company loses in the trial 
court but wins in the court of appeals while the stay is in place, FDA must 
approve the application on the date of the appellate court decision (again 
assuming the application is otherwise approvable).87 In these cases, the 
stay evaporates. In contrast, if the generic company loses in the trial court 
and fails to appeal, or it loses in the trial court and again in the court of 
appeals, the court must order the effective date of final approval to be no 
sooner than patent expiry.88 If FDA has already approved the generic drug 
because the stay has expired, FDA will rescind the approval.89 
Every listed patent plays a role in determining the timing of approval. 
If the innovator lists four patents in the ORANGE BOOK, for example, the 
generic company must address each, and FDA considers each. If the 
generic company defeats three patents (proving that one is invalid, for 
instance, and that it does not infringe the other two) but filed a paragraph 
III certification to the fourth patent, FDA cannot approve its abbreviated 
application until expiry of the fourth patent. If the generic company 
defeats two patents and is found to infringe two patents, FDA cannot 
approve its application until the infringed patents expire. 
3. A Generic Company’s Options
If a generic company believes it would infringe a patent, or if it fears 
it will lose the patent infringement suit brought by the innovator, it may 
86. 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(c)(3)(C)(i), 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(I) (2018). But see authorities cited supra 
note 85 and accompanying text for exceptions. 
87. 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(c)(3)(C)(ii)(I), 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(II)(aa) (2018). But see authorities cited
supra note 85 and accompanying text for exceptions. 
88. 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(c)(3)(C)(ii)(II), 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(II)(bb) (2018) (cross referencing 35
U.S.C. § 271(e)(4)(A)). The court may also enjoin the generic company from commercial 
manufacture, sale, and use of the product. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(4)(B) (2018). But this is a formality, 
because the company’s drug is not approved and cannot be marketed anyway. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) 
(2018). Separately, FDA requires the generic company to convert its paragraph IV certification to a 
paragraph III certification. 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(12)(viii)(A) (2020). Once the paragraph III 
certification is in place, approval of the abbreviated application may not take effect until the patent 
expires. 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(c)(3)(B), 355(j)(5)(B)(ii) (2018). 
89. E.g., Kathryn Phelps, FDA Rescinds Zofran ODT ANDA Approval, PINK SHEET (Nov. 29, 
2005), https://medtech.pharmaintelligence.informa.com/PS061322/FDA-Rescinds-Zofran-ODT-
ANDA-Approval [https://perma.cc/EP8H-4DQN] (“The agency revoked the ANDA Nov. 29 in light 
of an earlier district court decision that the generic ondansetron orally disintegrating tablets infringe 
an unexpired GSK patent.”). 
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seek a license. Settlements of paragraph IV litigation usually include a 
license allowing the generic company to bring its product to market earlier 
than the date of patent expiry.90 But there are other options as well. 
First, although the paragraph III and paragraph IV certifications are 
the primary options available to a generic company, the company has a 
third option if the patent claims a method of using the listed drug. It may 
decline to seek approval of the use.91 For example, if FDA has approved 
the innovator’s drug for two uses (such as breast cancer and stomach 
cancer) but the innovator holds only a patent claiming use of the drug for 
one (breast cancer), the generic company may seek approval of its drug 
for the other (stomach cancer). Although federal law requires a generic 
drug to have the same labeling as its reference drug, FDA will usually 
permit a generic company to omit descriptions of uses protected by 
patents (or statutory exclusivity).92 A generic company submitting a 
505(b)(2) application has the same option to omit a patented use from its 
labeling,93 but it does not have to worry about getting permission to do so 
because the statute does not require its product to have the same labeling 
in the first case. 
Second, a generic company could file a suitability petition and, upon 
approval of that petition, an ANDA proposing a difference that allows it 
to avoid patent infringement. Through this mechanism, it may be able to 
avoid a patent on the route of administration, dosage form, or strength of 
the listed drug. In this case, it would include a paragraph IV certification 
asserting non-infringement. It may also file a 505(b)(2) application for a 
product with more significant differences (including changes to the active 
ingredient) that need supporting safety and effectiveness data. Here too, 
the company would assert non-infringement. In both cases, the innovator 
might not sue if the generic company clearly avoided its patents. 
90. Keith M. Drake & Thomas G. McGuire, Generic Entry Before the Agreed-Upon Date in
Pharmaceutical Patent Settlements 1 (July 8, 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3416632 
[https://perma.cc/HXF8-WEHE] (“It is also common for these patent disputes to settle on terms that 
license the generic manufacturer to sell prior to the date of expiry of the disputed patent(s).”). 
91. 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(III)–(IV) (2018). 
92. There is one exception. FDA will not permit the omission if the generic drug would be less 
safe and effective than the reference listed drug for its remaining labeled uses. 
21 C.F.R. § 314.127(a)(7) (2020). In these cases, the generic company must include labeling that 
describes the infringing use, which in turn requires it to challenge the patent or wait for patent expiry. 
See id. But FDA rarely makes this finding. Erika Lietzan, Paper Promises for Drug Innovation, 25 
GEO. MASON L. REV. 168, 186 n.91 (2018). 
93. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2)(B) (2018). 
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4. Other Statutory Exclusivity
Two other statutory exclusivities bear mentioning. First, federal law 
offers exclusivity for drugs intended to treat rare diseases, also known as 
“orphan drugs.”94 An orphan drug receives seven years of orphan drug 
exclusivity.95 This exclusivity prevents approval of full applications 
(supported by their own data) as well as abbreviated applications. Also, 
like three-year exclusivity, orphan exclusivity can protect a new use of an 
already approved drug. Second, the statute provides six months of 
“pediatric exclusivity” if an innovator performs pediatric studies in 
response to a written request from FDA.96 Pediatric exclusivity protects 
every approved product containing the active moiety studied.97 It operates 
by extending other applicable exclusivity periods.98 For example, five-
year new-chemical-entity exclusivity will last for five and a half years, 
and seven-year orphan exclusivity will last for seven and a half years. A 
paragraph III certification, which would ordinarily delay FDA approval 
until patent expiry, will delay FDA approval another six months past 
patent expiry. 
C. Marketing, Prescribing, and Dispensing of Medicines 
FDA limits virtually every new medicine to dispensing only by 
prescription.99 The prescription must be written by a practitioner licensed 
under state law to administer the drug.100 State laws govern the licensure 
of prescribers and pharmacists, and they take differing approaches with 
respect to who may prescribe and the information to be included on a 
94. An orphan drug is one intended to treat a disease that affects fewer than 200,000 persons
in this country. It is also one that the innovator does not expect will produce sales allowing recovery 
of the costs of its own research and development. Id. §§ 360bb(a)(1)–(2). 
95. Id. § 360cc(a). 
96. Id. § 355a. The innovator does not have to apply for approval of a pediatric formulation or 
use to qualify for exclusivity; the award is tied to performing research requested by FDA. See FDA, 
Qualifying for Pediatric Exclusivity Under Section 505A of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act: Frequently Asked Questions on Pediatric Exclusivity (505A), at Q8, 
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/development-resources/qualifying-pediatric-exclusivity-under-section-
505a-federal-food-drug-and-cosmetic-act-frequently [https://perma.cc/EA7X-BUZ4]. Certain other 
conditions must also be met. 
97. FDA, supra note 96, at Q9. 
98. Id. at Q9; In 2012, Congress added another exclusivity provision to the statute that operates 
the same way. Section 505E of the statute provides a five-year extension of statutory exclusivity 
periods for “qualified infectious disease products,” which are new antibiotic and antifungal products 
intended to address serious or life-threatening infections. 21 U.S.C. § 355f (2018). 
99. Lars Noah, Reversal of Fortune: Moving Pharmaceuticals from Over-the-Counter to
Prescription Status?, 63 VILL. L. REV. 355, 359 (2018). 
100.  21 U.S.C. § 353(b)(1)(B) (2018). 
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prescription form.101 Prescribers may specify either branded drugs or 
generic drugs. A doctor could write the brand name, for instance, or 
identify a particular generic company’s drug containing a particular active 
ingredient. Or the doctor could simply identify the active ingredient, 
which will usually lead the pharmacist to dispense one of the available 
generic drugs. 
Innovators promote their drugs to doctors, payers, and patients. 
Generic companies rarely promote generic drugs to doctors and 
patients.102 They do, however, promote these drugs to payers, identifying 
the reference listed drugs they have copied and the lower prices they 
offer.103 Some generic companies that file abbreviated applications under 
§ 505(b)(2) brand these products and promote them to doctors and
patients based on their distinguishing features and clinical profiles.104 
Others—such as those who used § 505(b)(2) to avoid a patent but want to 
position their products as near-duplicates of more expensive branded 
alternatives—might focus on price promotion. FDA’s rules governing 
 101.  Patricia Zettler, Toward Coherent Federal Oversight of Medicine, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
427, 434–37 (2015) (discussing traditional authority of states over practice of medicine); Patricia 
Zettler, Pharmaceutical Federalism, 92 IND. L.J. 845, 849 and 849 n.15 (2017) (discussing state 
authority over practice of pharmacy). 
 102.  Association for Accessible Medicines (AAM), Generic Medicines, 
https://accessiblemeds.org/generic-medicines [https://perma.cc/43JJ-MGEM] (stating that “generic 
manufacturers rarely spend money on advertising and marketing”). AAM is the trade association 
representing manufacturers of generic and biosimilar medicines. Sometimes generic companies do 
promote their generic drugs, however, as a review of FDA’s enforcement actions makes clear. E.g., 
Letter from Andrew S.T. Haffer, Div. Dir. Office of Prescription Drug Promotion, to Samuel D. 
Waksal, Ph.D., Chairman & Chief Exec. Officer of Kadmon Pharms., Inc. (Nov. 18, 2013), 
http://www.natap.org/2013/HCV/RibasphereWarningLetter(1).pdf [https://perma.cc/ZSZ2-5AVU] 
(citing a generic company for promotion for a new use, by describing a broader patient population); 
Letter from Jessica N. Cleck Derenick, Team Leader Office of Prescription Drug Promotion, to Carol 
Childers, Dir. Teva Neuroscience, Inc., https://www.pharmamedtechbi.com/
~/media/Supporting%20Documents/The%20Pink%20Sheet%20DAILY/2013/April/Teva%20cloza
pine%20untitled%20letter%20040813.pdf [https://perma.cc/88SZ-CYYB] (citing a generic company 
for unsubstantiated superiority claims, omission of material facts, and minimization of risks). 
103.  The author has reviewed product catalogues distributed by generic drug companies. 
 104.  E.g., Brian Marson, Upsher-Smith Launches Osteoporosis Therapy Fortical in U.S., PINK 
SHEET (Aug. 15, 2005), https://pink.pharmaintelligence.informa.com/PS062726/UpsherSmith-
Launches-Osteoporosis-Therapy-Fortical-In-US [https://perma.cc/S6XR-BA6U] (noting that 
manufacturer of Fortical (calcitonin-salmon)—approved through a 505(b)(2) application—planned to 
“begin aggressively promoting to physicians through sales force detailing, national conventions, 
professional advertising and other promotion” and would focus on the “unique aspects of nasal 
calcitonin” and positioning its product as an “economical alternative to existing osteoporosis 
therapies”). 
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prescription drug advertising and promotion apply to both innovators and 
generic companies.105 
Once launched, generic drugs quickly take over the market.106 
Conventional wisdom holds that “therapeutic equivalence” evaluations 
assigned by FDA to generic drugs drive this market penetration.107 If FDA 
designates two drugs as therapeutically equivalent, this means that the 
products can be “substituted”—that either can be dispensed instead of the 
other—”with the full expectation that the substituted product can be 
expected to have the same clinical effect and safety profile as the 
prescribed product” when administered to patients under the conditions 
specified in its labeling.108 Generic drugs approved through conventional 
(not petitioned) ANDAs are usually deemed “therapeutically equivalent” 
to their reference drugs.109 Every state either permits or requires 
pharmacists to dispense a therapeutically equivalent generic drug when a 
doctor prescribes an innovator’s drug by its brand name, unless the doctor 
has said not to.110 
 105.  See generally Kathleen Sanzo & Stephen Paul Mahinka, Prescription Drug Promotion and 
Marketing, in FOOD AND DRUG LAW AND REGULATION (Adams et al. eds., 3d ed. 2015) (describing 
FDA’s rules governing prescription drug advertising and promotion). 
 106.  Henry Grabowski et al., Recent trends in brand-name and generic drug competition, 17 J. 
MED. ECON. 207, 212 (Fig. 4) (2013) (showing that approval of a generic drug leads to a roughly 70 
percent market share loss for innovators in situations where it leads to substitution); Murray L. Aitken 
et al., The Regulation of Prescription Drug Competition and Market Responses: Patterns in Prices 
and Sales Following Loss of Exclusivity 243, 250–51 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper 
No. 19487, 2013), https://www.nber.org/chapters/c13094.pdf [https://perma.cc/R44L-8UUT] 
(finding that six drugs that lost exclusivity between 2009 and 2013 lost 60% of their market share 
within (on average) three months of generic entry); Ralf Boscheck, Intellectual Property Rights and 
the Evergreening of Pharmaceuticals, 50 INTERECONOMICS REV. EUROPEAN ECON. POL’Y 221, 224 
(2015) (“As patents expire, the first generic competitor typically enters the market with a 20 to 30 per 
cent discount relative to the branded product, capturing about 44 to 80 per cent of total sales within 
the first full year after launch.”). 
 107.  E.g., New York ex rel. Scheiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 642–43 (2d Cir. 2015) 
(stating that “generic competition depends heavily on state drug substitution”); id. at 649 (noting 
district court’s finding that innovator’s explicit purpose in introducing an extended release version of 
its product “was to impede generic competition and to avoid the patent cliff—which occurs at the end 
of a drug’s exclusivity period when generics gain market share through state substitution laws”). 
108.  ORANGE BOOK, supra note 43, at vii. 
 109.  Lietzan, Paper Promises, supra note 92, at 187. With rare exceptions, products approved 
under § 505(b)(2) are not deemed therapeutically equivalent to their reference products. See Kurt 
Karst, Citizen Petition Requests Rulemaking Process for 505(b)(2) NDA Therapeutic Equivalence 
Rating Decisions, MARTINDALE (Sept. 12, 2011), https://www.martindale.com/health-care-
law/article_Hyman-Phelps-McNamara-PC_1341198.htm [https://perma.cc/7EB8-RV8B] (listing 
exceptions). 
110.  See Michael A. Carrier & Steve D. Shadowen, Product Hopping: A New Framework, 92 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 167, 175 (2016) (“States have also made it easier for generics to reach the 
market through their enactment of drug product selection (DPS) laws. Such laws, in effect in all fifty 
states today, . . . allow (and in some cases require) pharmacists—absent a doctor’s contrary 
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Although it is tempting to assume that generic companies depend on 
automatic substitution for market share, the reality may be a bit more 
nuanced. Only 15 states expressly require substitution.111 In these states, 
pharmacy law will require the pharmacist to substitute the generic drug 
for the prescribed brand drug, even if the payer is agnostic. But most states 
have permissive laws. Of these, 32 states expressly permit it,112 2 permit 
it indirectly by statute,113 and 1 permits it indirectly through the structure 
instructions—to fill prescriptions for brand-name drugs with generic versions.”); Scheiderman, 787 
F.3d at 645 (stating that every state either “permit[s] or require[s] pharmacists to dispense a 
therapeutically equivalent, lower-cost generic drug in place of a brand drug absent express direction 
from the prescribing physician that the prescription must be dispensed as written”); see also Federal 
Trade Commission’s Brief as Amicus Curiae at 6, Mylan Pharmaceuticals v. Warner Chilcott Pub. 
Ltd. Co., No. 12-3821, 2015 WL 1736957 (E.D. Penn. Apr. 16, 2015) (“Today, all states facilitate 
competition through laws that allow a pharmacist to substitute an AB-rated generic drug when 
presented with a prescription for its brand equivalent, unless a physician directs or the patient requests 
otherwise.”). 
 111.  FLA. STAT. § 465.025(2) (2019); HAW. REV. STAT. § 328-92(a) (2019); KY. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 217.822(1) (2019); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32 § 13781 (2019); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 151.21 
(West 2019); MINN. R. 9505.0340(H) (2020); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 639.2583(1)(a) (West 2019); 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:6E-7 (West 2016); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6816-a (McKinney 2019); 35 PA. STAT. 
AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 960.3(a) (West 2019); 5 R.I. GEN. LAWS. ANN. § 5-19.1-19 (West 2019); 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 405 (West 2019); 20-4 VT. CODE R. § 1400:10.19 (2020); VA. CODE 
ANN. § 65.2-603.1(B) (2019); W. VA. CODE § 30-5-12b(b) (2019); WIS. STAT. § 450.13(1s) 
(2018). Michigan requires substitution “when a purchaser requests a lower cost generically equivalent 
drug product.” MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.17755 (2019). 
 112.  ALA. CODE § 34-23-8(1) (2019); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 08.80.295(a) (West 2019); ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-1963.01(A) (2019); ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-92-503(a)(1) (2019); CAL. BUS. & 
PROF. CIV. CODE § 4073(a) (West 2019); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-42.5-122(1)(a) (2019); CONN. 
GEN STAT. § 20-619(b) (2019); 24 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 2549(a) (2020); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-
4-81(a) (2019); IDAHO CODE § 54-1768 (2019); 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 85/25 (2019); IND. 
CODE § 16-42-22 (2019); IOWA CODE § 155A.32 (2020); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-1637(g)(1) 
(2019); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH OCC. § 12-504 (d) (West 2019); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 
112, § 12D (West 2019); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.17755 (West 2020); MISS. CODE. 
ANN. § 73-21-117 (2019); MO. REV. STAT. § 338.056(1) (2019); MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-7-505(1) 
(2019); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-28,111 (West 2019); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 318:47-d (2019); 
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 26-3-3 (2019); N.C. GEN. ANN. STAT. § 90-85.28(a) (West 2019); N.D. CENT. 
CODE ANN. § 19-02.1-14.1(3) (West 2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4729.38(B) (West 2020); OR. 
REV. STAT. § 689.515(2) (2019); S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-24-30(A) (2019); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 58-
29E-8 (2020); TENN. CODE ANN. § 53-10-202 (2020); TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 562.008(b) (West 
2019); UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-17b-605(b) (West 2019); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 33-24-147(b) (2019). 
 113.  Louisiana prohibits improper substitution. LA. STAT. ANN. § 37:1241(17) (2019) 
(prohibiting substituting against a prescriber’s or purchaser’s consent). Oklahoma prohibits 
pharmacists from substituting, ”without authority of the prescriber or purchaser, any like drug, 
medicine, chemical or pharmaceutical preparation.” OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 353.24(B)(4) (West 
2019) (“No pharmacist being requested to sell, furnish or compound any drug, medicine, chemical or 
other pharmaceutical preparation, by prescription or otherwise, shall substitute or cause to be 
substituted for it, without authority of the prescriber or purchaser, any like drug, medicine, chemical 
or pharmaceutical preparation.”). 
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of the approved prescription form.114 In these states, if a generic drug is 
therapeutically equivalent to the prescribed drug and the payer requires its 
use, the permissive state pharmacy law makes it possible for a pharmacist 
to substitute, in accordance with the patient’s insurance, without 
consulting the physician. In these cases, the patient’s insurance drives the 
drug selection. State law just makes it possible to comply with the 
insurance without contacting the doctor.115 
Payers may also adopt strategies to steer doctors and patients to less 
expensive drugs that are not therapeutically equivalent.116 These 
alternative drugs can include generic copies of older innovative drugs, as 
well as therapeutically similar (rather than equivalent) drugs, such as 
those approved through the § 505(b)(2) mechanism.117 Thus, even if a 
doctor specifies a branded product, the patient’s insurance might prompt 
a conversation among the doctor, pharmacist, and patient, leading to the 
dispensing of a less expensive alternative made by a generic company. 
Whether FDA has designated that drug as therapeutically equivalent to 
the doctor’s initial choice of branded product may not matter.118 
III. USE OF “EVERGREENING” IN THE LITERATURE
Writers who use the term “evergreening” focus on a combination of 
circumstances within the framework just described. Subpart A catalogues 
 114.  Washington’s prescription form contains a section where the prescriber must note “whether 
or not a therapeutically equivalent generic drug . . . may be substituted[.]” WASH. REV. 
CODE § 69.41.120(1) (2019). When filling Washington prescriptions specifying substitution is 
allowed or filling out-of-state prescriptions where no explicit instruction is noted, Washington 
pharmacists “may substitute a therapeutically equivalent generic drug . . . .” Id. 
 115.  Many insurers require their insured to use therapeutically equivalent generic drugs. E.g., 
BOSTON MEDICAL CENTER HEALTHNET PLAN, Pharmacy Programs, https://www.bmchp.org/I-Am-
A/Provider/Pharmacy/Pharmacy-Programs [https://perma.cc/H436-APNQ] (stating that once FDA 
has granted an A rating to the generic drug, the plan will cover the brand product only if the patient 
has an allergy to an inactive ingredient in the generic drug or the patient has not responded adequately 
to at least two other covered drugs in the same class). 
 116.  See Dana P. Goldman et al., Prescription drug cost sharing: associations with medication 
and medical utilization and spending and health, 298 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 61, 61 (2007) (considering 
role of prior authorization, step therapy, closed formularies, and reference pricing—along with 
mandatory generic substitution—in driving the selection of lower cost alternatives). 
 117.  See Joanna Shepherd, Deterring Innovation: NY v. Actavis and the Duty to Subsidize 
Competitors’ Market Entry, 17 MINN. J.L., SCI. & TECH. 663, 688–92 (2016). 
 118.  See also Jennifer N. Howard et al., Influencers of generic drug utilization: A systematic 
review, 14 RES. SOC. & ADMIN. PHARM. 619, 624 (2018) (noting that “formulary management” and 
“cost containment measures” have their “intended effect of increasing generic drug use” and that 
“federal and state health insurance policies” are a “major factor influencing broad changes in generic 
drug use by encouraging generic drug use in the Medicare and Medicaid programs”). 
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the definitions in the literature.119 Subpart B sorts the roughly three dozen 
examples that scholars put forward as illustrations of the concept. Subpart 
C describes the empirical studies that some say support “evergreening” 
allegations. Although this Article focuses on usage in the scholarly 
literature, similar usage of the metaphor appears in the popular press,120 
court decisions and filings,121 and policy writing.122 
 119.  Some use the term “evergreening” without explaining it, apparently assuming their 
audiences will understand the term from context. E.g., Faisal I. Chaudhry, Intellectual Property and 
the Global Crisis of Non-Communicable Disease, 19 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 175 (2017) (using the term 
several times without definition); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Nonobviousness: A Comment on Three 
Learned Papers, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 431, 437 (2008) (“Chemical cases have their own 
standard (which involves a different use of hindsight), and for pharmaceuticals, the court is more 
likely to uphold a patent on a new therapeutic agent than to allow the patentee to engage in 
‘evergreening.’”) (citing Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Pharma’s Nonobvious Problem, 12 LEWIS & CLARK 
L. REV. 375 (2008) but not explaining the term); Sam F. Halabi, International Intellectual Property 
Shelters, 90 TUL. L. REV. 903, 920 (2016) (“The text of TPP states that patentability must be permitted 
for ‘new uses of a known product, new methods of using a known product, or new processes of a 
known product,’ suggesting it would include products that did not improve the known product and 
that could encompass, in part, evergreening strategies by pharmaceutical firms.”) (not defining the 
term); Yaniv Heled, Why Primary Patents Covering Biologics Should Be Unenforceable Against 
Generic Applicants Under the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act, 21 ANNALS HEALTH 
L. 211, 220 (2011) (proposing to make certain patents unenforceable against biosimilar products, but 
permitting enforcement of “secondary patents covering inventions stemming from” continued 
research, though adding that this might lead to “litigation involving secondary patents (with all of its 
risks of evergreening and patent abuse)”) (not defining the term); Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patent 
Experimentalism, 101 VA. L. REV. 65, 122 (2015) (stating that the Indian Supreme Court “recently 
affirmed the high bar for obtaining ‘evergreening’ patents” and—in footnote 238—noting that the 
decision involved “a patent on a cancer drug with enhanced stability and bioavailability,” but not 
defining the term). Some writers describe circumstances that, they say, others call “evergreening.” 
E.g., Cynthia M. Ho, A Collision Course Between TRIPS Flexibilities and Investor-State 
Proceedings, 6 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 395, 442 (2016) (stating “industry has a practice of sequentially 
patenting minor modifications or different uses of a drug after first obtaining a patent on the basic 
chemical compound in an attempt to maximize revenue,” which “public health advocates” and “some 
governments including not only India, but also the EU, consider” to be “an inappropriate way of 
‘evergreening’ patent profits”). 
 120.  E.g., Rumman Ahmed & Amol Sharma, Corporate News: Novartis in Fight for Cancer 
Pill, WALL STREET J., Aug. 20, 2012, at B3; Editorial Board, India’s Novartis Decision, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 5, 2013, at A22; Melissa Healy, Alzheimer’s drug draws sharp criticism; Two experts call 
Aricept 23 mg’s march to market ‘perplexing’ and ‘depressing,’ L.A. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2012, at A12. 
 121.  E.g., AstraZeneca Pharm. LP v. Food & Drug Admin., 872 F. Supp. 2d 60, 89 (D.D.C. 
2012) (“As the FDA notes, AstraZeneca’s interpretation would result in an ‘unwarranted evergreening 
of exclusivity.’”). 
 122.  And it has crept into policy writing. E.g., Graham Dutfield, Healthcare innovation and 
patent law’s “pharmaceutical privilege”: is there a pharmaceutical privilege? And if so, should we 
remove it?, 12 HEALTH ECON. POL’Y & L. 453, 466 (2017); Tahir Amin & Aaron Kesselheim, 
Secondary Patenting Of Branded Pharmaceuticals: A Case Study Of How Patents On Two HIV Drugs 
Could Be Extended For Decades, 31 HEALTH AFF. 2286, 2286 (2012); see generally Thomas A. 
Faunce & Joel Lexchin, ‘Linkage’ pharmaceutical evergreening in Canada and Australia, 4 AUSTL. 
& N.Z. HEALTH POL’Y 8, June 1, 2007. 
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A. Definitions Offered 
Definitions of “evergreening” in the academic literature fall in three 
categories.123 Some definitions focus only on actions of concern taken by 
innovators; most also mention extension of something; and a minority also 
talk about an objective or result relating to pricing or competition in the 
market. They disagree about what has been “evergreened” in the 
situations they describe: an invention,124 a drug or product,125 the drug’s 
price,126 the drug’s patent or patent life,127 the drug’s exclusivity,128 the 
company’s profits129 or monopoly,130 or something else.131 But no matter 
which definition is in play, and what exactly has been “evergreened,” the 
scholarship consistently treats “evergreening” as bad. Almost without 
exception, scholars using the term “evergreening” criticize the actions. 
 123.  For simplicity this Article uses the term “definition” even though some writers may feel 
they were offering something less formal, perhaps more of a description. Most definitions in the text 
derive from legal scholarship written by academic scholars. The footnotes cast a wider net. 
 124.  E.g., Ron A. Bouchard, Qualifying Intellectual Property II: A New Innovation Index for 
Pharmaceutical Patents & Products, 28 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 287, 402 
(2012) (discussing a patentee that “evergreens an invention via successive patents”). 
 125.  E.g., Ron A. Bouchard et al., Structure-Function Analysis of Global Pharmaceutical 
Linkage Regulations, 12 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 391, 430 (2011) (“evergreening older products”); 
Andrew Hitchings et al., Making Medicines Evergreen, 345 BMJ, December 8, 2012, at 18, 20 
(“evergreen medicine”). 
 126.  E.g., Robin Feldman, May your drug price be evergreen, 5 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 590, 590 
(2018). 
 127.  E.g., Steven Adamson, Pharmaceutical Patent Wars, Reverse-Payment Settlements, and 
Their Anticompetitive Effects for Consumers, 30 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 241, 250 (2018) (“patent 
evergreening”); Brook K. Baker & Katrina Geddes, Corporate Power Unbound: Investorstate 
Arbitration of IP Monopolies on Medicines—Eli Lilly v. Canada and the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Agreement, 23 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 26 (2015) (“evergreening patent”). 
 128.  E.g., Frederick M. Abbott, The WTO Medicines Decision: World Pharmaceutical Trade 
and the Protection of Public Health, 99 AM. J. INT’L. L. 317, 350 n.241 (2005) (evergreening of 
“marketing exclusivity”); Brook K. Baker, Ending Drug Registration Apartheid: Taming Data 
Exclusivity and Patent/Registration Linkage, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 303, 306 (2008) (evergreening of 
“data exclusivity”). 
 129.  E.g., Ho, Collision Course, supra note 119 at 442 (evergreening “patent profits”); Cynthia 
M. Ho, Reexamining Eli Lilly v. Canada: A Human Rights Approach to Investor-State Disputes?, 21 
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 437, 464 (2018) (“profits will continue (be ‘ever green’)”). 
 130.  E.g., Brook K. Baker, International Collaboration on IP/Access to Medicines: Birth of 
South Africa’s Fix the Patent Laws Campaign, 60 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 297, 319 (2016) (“evergreen 
their patent monopolies”); Sean M. Flynn et al., The U.S. Proposal for an Intellectual Property 
Chapter in the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, 28 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 105, 156 (2012) (each 
new patent leads to a new patent term, thereby “‘evergreening’ monopoly rights on the underlying 
medical product”). 
 131.  E.g., Christopher M. Holman, Biotechnology’s Prescription for Patent Reform, 5 J. 
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 318, 332 (2006) (companies evergreening “their proprietary 
position”); Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Note, How Many Patents Does It Take to Make A Drug- Follow-
on Pharmaceutical Patents and University Licensing, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 299, 
320 (2010) (evergreening the drug’s “patent protection”). 
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Some label it an “abuse” of patent law or “gaming” of the law.132 Many 
call the changes “trivial” or “frivolous.”133 Some call the innovators 
“unscrupulous.”134 Some call evergreening “problematic.”135 Some write 
 132.  E.g., Yaniv Heled, Regulatory Competitive Shelters, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 299, 341 (2015) 
(“abuse . . . through such infamous practices as ‘evergreening’”); Holman, Biotechnology’s 
Prescription, supra note 131, at 332 (stating that patent applicants can “abuse” the patent prosecution 
process “by filing divisional patent applications incorporating new or revised claims to obtain 
multiple patents that all cover essentially the same invention,” a “tactic referred to as ‘evergreening’ 
that has become especially associated with pharmaceutical inventions”); Yahong Li, Intellectual 
Property and Public Health: Two Sides of the Same Coin, 6 ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & 
POL’Y 389, 397 (2011) (“‘evergreening patents’ are generally perceived as patent abuse”); Bryan 
Mercurio, The Impact of the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement on the Provision of 
Health Services in Australia, 26 WHITTIER L. REV. 1051, 1092 n.115 (May 2005) (writing that the 
30-month stay provisions in the United States “led to abuse of the patent system through evergreening 
tactics that delay the introduction of generic drugs”); Andrew F. Christie et al., Patents Associated 
with High-Cost Drugs in Australia, 8 PLOS ONE 4, April 2013, at 1, 1 (referring to “longstanding 
concerns about the misuse of patents by pharmaceutical companies to inappropriately extend their 
monopoly position”); Dutfield, supra note 122, at 466 (“incremental inventions may be regarded as 
examples of gaming the system by acquiring extended or new patent monopolies not justified by the 
minor level of inventive contribution or the possibly negligible added benefit to the public” and they 
are “commonly referred to as ‘evergreening’”); William J. Bennett, Note, Indian Pharmaceutical 
Patent Law and the Effects of Novartis AG v. Union of India, 13 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 
535, 544 (2014) (noting that “critics” call evergreening a “common abusive patenting practice”). 
 133.  E.g., Mark A. Lemley, Expecting the Unexpected, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1369, 1393 
(2017) (“pharmaceutical companies often obtain follow-on patents on trivial variants of their basic 
chemical once the initial patent is about to expire”); Daryl Lim, Self-Replicating Technologies and 
the Challenge for the Patent and Antitrust Laws, 32 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 131, 218 (2013) 
(“trivial changes are made to the drugs”); Jerome H. Reichman, Rethinking the Role of Clinical Trial 
Data in International Intellectual Property Law: The Case for A Public Goods Approach, 13 MARQ. 
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 38–39 (2009) (discussing “minor improvements” made to an existing patent 
as “an excuse to prolong or ‘evergreen’ that same patented product,” which he describes as having 
“low public health utility”); Tatum Anderson, Rejected Novartis Cases Leave India’s TRIPS 
Compliance Unchallenged, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Aug. 7, 2007), https://www.ip-
watch.org/2007/08/07/rejected-novartis-cases-leave-indias-trips-compliance-unchallenged/ 
[https://perma.cc/U5C9-3D89] (“[Section 3(d) of India’s Patent Act] was drafted with the prevention 
of a particular practice in mind: evergreening, where pharmaceutical companies patent frivolous 
changes to their drugs in order to extend patent protection, thereby preventing generic companies 
from manufacturing cheaper drugs the poor can better afford.”). 
 134.  E.g., Michael H. Davis, Excluding Patentability of Therapeutic Methods, Including 
Methods Using Pharmaceuticals, for the Treatment of Humans Under Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights Article 27(3)(a), 43 HOFSTRA L. REV. 185, 194 (2014) (defining 
“evergreening” as a process “by which unscrupulous pharmaceutical manufacturers file additional 
uses for drugs whose patents are immediately expiring—thus triggering an additional twenty-year 
period for each use, extending the effective patent term of the underlying drug”); see also Adamson, 
supra note 127, at 257–58 (describing “product hopping,” which “makes use of patent evergreening” 
and is an “obstructionist” strategy). 
 135.  E.g., Janet Freilich, The Paradox of Legal Equivalents and Scientific Equivalence: 
Reconciling Patent Law’s Doctrine of Equivalents with the FDA’s Bioequivalence Requirement, 66 
SMU L. REV. 59, 105 (2013) (stating that evergreening is “widely considered a negative behavior” 
and “an example of pharmaceutical companies exploiting loopholes in legislation to achieve a longer 
patent term than otherwise entitled” and adding that it is “problematic” because it “delays the market 
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of the need to prevent it or propose changes in the law to do so.136 Critical 
language has crept into the popular press137 as well as policymaking 
discussions.138 
1. Focus on Actions
First, some writers focus on actions taken by innovators: securing 
patents other than active ingredient patents, for instance, or introducing 
and patenting new products. Some also focus on listing new patents in the 
ORANGE BOOK, some focus on promotion of the new products, and some 
equate the term to “product hopping,” which they define in various ways. 
entry of low-cost generic drugs”); Baker, International Collaboration, supra note 130, at 319 
(“Extensive academic commentary suggests that such evergreening is a major problem.”); Timothy 
Bazzle, Note, Pharmacy of the Developing World: Reconciling Intellectual Property Rights in India 
with the Right to Health: Trips, India’s Patent System and Essential Medicines, 42 GEO. J. INT’L L. 
785, 802 (2011) (“pernicious practice”); Lev D. Gabrilovich, Motivating the Person of Ordinary Skill 
in the Art: Eli Lilly and Co. et al. v. Teva Parenteral Med., Inc. and the Federal Circuit’s 
Interpretation of the “Teaching, Suggestion, or Motivation” Test in Obviousness-Type Double 
Patenting, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ONLINE 271, 272 (2013) (“The pharmaceutical industry is plagued 
with evergreening.”). 
 136.  E.g., Srividhya Ragavan, The (Re)newed Barrier to Access to Medication: Data 
Exclusivity, 51 AKRON L. REV. 1163, 1183 (2018) (recommending that developing countries should 
start data exclusivity as soon as a chemical entity is the subject of a marketing application anywhere 
in the world, to “prevent evergreening of the data”); Roberto Romandini, Flexibilities Under Trips: 
An Analysis of the Proposal for Reforming Brazilian Patent Law, 15 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. 
PROP. L. 150, passim (2016) (discussing various ways to “prevent” evergreening); Sean B. 
Seymore, Reinvention, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1031, 1056–70, 1068 n.317 (2017) (proposing a new 
novelty paradigm and noting that it would “prevent evergreening”); see also Josef Drexl, Real 
Knowledge Is to Know the Extent of One’s Own Ignorance: On the Consumer Harm Approach in 
Innovation-Related Competition Cases, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 677, 695 n.66 (2010) (stating that the PTO 
once “widely” granted “evergreening” patents, but “now such applications are subject to challenge 
under a more stringent non-obviousness test”). 
 137.  E.g., Editorial Board, Have drug prices gotten too high? Combat games drugmakers play 
with patent laws, NEWS PRESS (Fort Myers), July 21 2019, at A3 (“The pharmaceutical industry has 
shown contempt for this attempt at balance through a range of abusive tactics. . . . Evergreening 
involves making small alterations to a drug—a slight change to its chemical composition, say, or an 
external change as minor as adding a stripe to a pill—and then filing a new patent application.”). 
 138.  E.g., Recent Developments Which May Impact Consumer Access to, and Demand for, 
Pharmaceuticals: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health of the Comm. on Energy & Commerce in 
the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. 139 (June 13, 2001) (statement of the National 
Association of Chain Drug Stores) (“We are also concerned with certain brand-name manufacturer 
‘evergreening’ strategies . . . .”); Insulin Access and Affordability: Hearing Before the S. Sp. Aging 
Comm., 116th Cong. 8 (statement of Jeremy A. Greene, Professor of Medicine and History of 
Medicine, Johns Hopkins University) (May 8, 2018) (“Several pharmaceutical industry analysts have 
described a repatenting tactic called evergreening . . . .”); Hearing on President Trump’s Drug 
Pricing Plan Before the S. HELP Comm., 116th Cong. 16 (June 12, 2018) (statement of Sen. Collins) 
(“I’m also very concerned about the problems of gaming the patent system through strategies such as 
patent thickets and evergreening.”). 
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Securing multiple patents. Several write that “evergreening” is 
“obtaining multiple patents covering the same product.”139 Some describe 
“evergreening” as “the securing of additional patents that expire after the 
expiration of the original patent for an invention.”140 Another scholar, 
writing a report for Congress, states that “‘evergreening’ generally 
consists of obtaining multiple patents that cover different aspects of the 
same product” and is also known as “stockpiling” or “layering.”141 
Making and patenting changes. Scholars say “evergreening” occurs 
“when pharmaceutical companies take existing drugs, alter them slightly, 
and get them approved.”142 Or they say “evergreening” is “used to label 
practices where a small change is made to an existing product and claimed 
as a new invention.”143 Some say “evergreening” is the same as “patent 
stacking” and involves “introduc[ing]—and seek[ing] additional patent 
protection for—sustained release formulations that require less frequent 
dosing or a slightly modified form of the active ingredient with 
purportedly greater safety or effectiveness.”144 One says “‘evergreening’ 
[is] a common practice used by drug companies to obtain additional 
patents for small improvements to previously patented compounds.”145 
Another writes that a company “evergreens” its “patents by filing patent 
applications with marginally different applications or modalities from the 
protected patents.”146 Another says “evergreening” is a “strategy” by 
which patent holders apply “for patents for slight variations of the first 
pharmaceutical patent, for instance, with regard to the specific new uses 
of the compound, production methods, different crystalline forms, 
 139.  Mark A. Lemley, What Ifs and Other Alternative Intellectual Property and Cyberlaw 
Story: Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19, 30 (2008); see also Randy Berholtz et al., Where 
to File: A Framework for Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology Companies to Develop an International 
Patent Filing Strategy, 37 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 225, 276 (2015) (“multiple patents on the same 
drug”). 
 140.  Lee Petherbridge & Jason Rantanen, The Pseudo-Elimination of Best Mode: Worst 
Possible Choice?, 59 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 170, 176 (2012); see also Justine Amy Park, Note, Product 
Hopping: Antitrust Liability and A Per Se Rule, 35 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 745, 755 n.85 (2017) 
(equating “evergreening” and “stacking patents”). 
 141.  JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. R40917, PATENT “EVERGREENING”: ISSUES IN 
INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 1 (2009). 
 142.  Ryan Abbott, Balancing Access and Innovation in India’s Shifting IP Regime, 35 
WHITTIER L. REV. 341, 344 (2014). 
 143.  Ryan Abbott, Of Evergreening and Efficacy: The Glivec Patent Case, GESPAM, 3 (April 
29, 2013), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2258904 [https://perma.cc/SQB4-A5G8]. 
 144.  Lars Noah, Product Hopping 2.0: Getting the FDA to Yank Your Original License Beats 
Stacking Patents, 19 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 161, 166 (2015). 
 145.  Cynthia M. Ho, A New World Order for Addressing Patent Rights and Public Health, 82 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1469, 1512 (2007). 
 146.  Sam F. Halabi, Multipolarity, Intellectual Property, and the Internationalization of Public 
Health Law, 35 MICH. J. INT’L L. 715, 757 (2014). 
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combinations with other drugs, the dosage regime or reformulations, at 
the end of the first patent term.”147 
And listing the patents. One scholar (now in practice) writes that 
“evergreening” refers to the “process” whereby “brand name 
manufacturers obtain secondary patents on incremental improvements to 
their products and then add those patents to the ORANGE BOOK listing for 
their licensed drugs.”148 Others state that “‘evergreening’ [is] the process 
by which pharmaceutical companies file a number of patents on minor 
improvements to their drugs and then list those patents in the ORANGE 
BOOK.”149 
And taking steps to “shift” customers to the new product. One 
writes that “evergreening” occurs when drug companies “patent a closely 
related compound when the original patented compound is set to expire 
and devote a significant marketing campaign to shift the consumers to the 
new patented drug.”150 Others describe “evergreening” as involving two 
steps: “(1) reformulating the product in a way that makes a generic version 
of the original not substitutable; and (2) encouraging doctors to write 
prescriptions for the reformulated, rather than the original, product.”151 
Which is sometimes also described as “product hopping.” Several 
say “evergreening” is the same as “product hopping” and “line extension,” 
and “refers to a drug company’s reformulation of its product.”152 
According to another, “ever-greening” or “product hopping” is a “trick” 
in which “a company produces a ‘me too’ drug that copies its own 
successful drug when its patent is set to expire.”153 Another says 
“evergreening” is the same as “product hopping” and occurs when a 
company obtains “a series of patents all relating to the same drug, with 
 147.  Josef Drexl, Real Knowledge Is to Know the Extent of One’s Own Ignorance: On the 
Consumer Harm Approach in Innovation-Related Competition Cases, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 677, 695 
n.66 (2010). 
 148.  Anna B. Laakmann, The Hatch-Waxman Act’s Side Effects: Precautions for Biosimilars, 
47 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 917, 928 (2014). 
 149.  Freilich, Paradox, supra note 135, at 74–75; see also Ron A. Bouchard et al., Empirical 
Analysis of Drug Approval-Drug Patenting Linkage for High Value Pharmaceuticals, 8 NW. J. TECH. 
& INTELL. PROP. 174, 181 n.45 (2010) (referring to comparable provisions in Canadian law when 
defining “evergreening” as “undue extension of the statutory monopoly attached to drug product by 
means of listing on the patent register multiple patents with obvious or uninventive modifications”). 
 150.  Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Zombie Patents and Zombie Companies with Patents, 69 FLA. L. REV. 
1147, 1154 (2017). 
151.  Carrier & Shadowen, supra note 110, at 171. 
 152.  Michael A. Carrier, A Real-World Analysis of Pharmaceutical Settlements: The Missing 
Dimension of Product Hopping, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1009, 1016 (2010); see also Carrier & 
Shadowen, supra note 110, at 171. 
153.  Eugene McCarthy, The Pharma Barons: Corporate Law’s Dangerous New Race to the 
Bottom in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 8 MICH. BUS. & ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. 29, 53 (2018). 
28
Akron Law Review, Vol. 53 [2019], Iss. 4, Art. 2
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol53/iss4/2
2019] THE “EVERGREENING” METAPHOR 833 
the later patents claiming merely minor variations in dosage and 
packing.”154 “Patent evergreening” includes “strategic product 
hopping.”155 Evergreening is the same as “product hopping,” a recent 
article claims, and it refers to “shifting market demand to a new 
formulation of a drug.”156 Two scholars write that “product hopping” is a 
“variant of evergreening” that involves making a “small change” to an 
approved drug “right as its patents or regulatory exclusivities are about to 
expire, and introduc[ing] the new formulation as an entirely new drug. . . . 
generally protected by new patents,” after which the company “forces a 
market shift away from the old drug—just as it is approaching its patent 
cliff.”157 
2. Focus on “Extension” of Something
Second, most writers define “evergreening” as trying to “extend” 
something or doing so—a drug’s patent coverage, its effective patent life, 
its exclusivity, the company’s monopoly power, or even patents 
themselves. Some use verbs such as “prolonging,” “refreshing,” or 
“maintaining”—rather than “extending”—but the idea is the same. 
Extension. One writer says that “evergreening” is an “extension 
tactic” in which “pharmaceutical companies succeed in patenting new 
formulations and applications of a drug.”158 
Extending patents themselves. Two others write that a company 
seeks to “evergreen” patents if it seeks to “extend [its] patents on weak 
grounds.”159 
Refreshing a drug’s patents. One scholar has used the concept of 
“refreshing” patents in several papers, writing, for instance, that 
“evergreening” refers to “patent holders’ attempts to refresh their patents 
by patenting updated versions, alternative delivery methods, or other 
variations of the original product.”160 In a subsequent paper, she writes 
that “evergreening” is the “practice of attempting to refresh one’s patents 
by patenting extended release versions, alternative delivery methods, or 
 154.  Thomas F. Cotter, Patents, Antitrust, and the High Cost of Health Care, 13 ANTITRUST 
SOURCE 1, 3–4 (2014). 
 155.  Dmitry Karshtedt, The More Things Change: Improvement Patents, Drug Modifications 
and the FDA, 104 IOWA L. REV. 1129, 1141 n.64 (2019) (quoting Thomas, supra note 141). 
156.  Jordan Paradise, Regulatory Silence at the FDA, 102 MINN. L. REV. 2383, 2398 (2018). 
 157.  Robin Feldman & Evan Frondorf, Drug Wars: A New Generation of Generic 
Pharmaceutical Delay, 53 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 499, 527 (2016). 
158.  Sarah Harding, Perpetual Property, 61 FLA. L. REV. 285, 305 (2009). 
159.  Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, The Battle to Define Asia’s Intellectual Property 
Law: From TPP to RCEP, 8 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 331, 346 (2018). 
160.  Robin Feldman, Rethinking Rights in Biospace, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 30 (2005). 
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other variations of the original product.”161 Others have picked up the 
word “refresh,” for instance, writing that “evergreening” means the 
“attempt by patentees to refresh their expiring patents with new ones by 
making minor modifications to subject matter that should go to the public 
domain.”162 
Extending a drug’s patent coverage, patent protection, or 
intellectual property protection. One scholar says that “evergreening” 
refers to “filing for improvement patents,” which means that “patent 
coverage” will be “extended.”163 Another claims that “evergreening” is 
the “strategy adopted by patentees who seek to extend their period of 
patent protection by applying for secondary patents over related or 
derivative technologies.”164 One scholar asserts that companies adopt 
“‘evergreening’ strategies that add new patents to their quivers as old ones 
expire” to “prolong their effective periods of patent protection.”165 
“Evergreening,” according to another, means “maintaining patent 
protection on a therapeutic compound for multiple patent terms,” which 
companies can accomplish “by devising new methods for using the 
compound to treat disease, by creating new dosage forms, or by 
incorporating the compound into new dosage media (such as slow-release 
capsules or a patch).”166 Another article defines “‘evergreening’ [as] the 
practice of obtaining new patents on minor variations of, or improvements 
to, an existing pharmaceutical, principally to extend a manufacturer’s 
 161.  Robin Feldman et al., Empirical Evidence of Drug Pricing Games—A Citizen’s Pathway 
Gone Astray, 20 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 39, 50 n.39 (2017) (citing Robin Feldman, RETHINKING 
PATENT LAW 170–77 (2012)). 
162.  Seymore, Reinvention, supra note 136, at 1069 n.317. 
 163.  Karl F. Jorda, Patent and Trade Secret Complementariness: An Unsuspected Synergy, 48 
WASHBURN L.J. 1, 24 (2008). 
164.  Dipika Jain, Gene-Patenting and Access to Healthcare: Achieving Precision, 36 HOUS. J. 
INT’L L. 101, 135 n.243 (2014) (citing Robert Chalmers, Evergreen or Deciduous? Australia Trends 
in Relation to the ‘Evergreening’ of Patents, 30 MELB. U. L. REV. 29, 29 (2006)); see also Rajarshi 
Banarjee, Note, The Success of, and Response to, India’s Law Against Patent Layering, 54 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. ONLINE 204, 207 (2013) (“evergreening” refers to the various “practices” used by drug 
companies “to extend the period of patent protection available to their products”); Lisa Cosgrove et 
al., Digital aripiprazole or digital evergreening? A systematic review of the evidence and its 
dissemination in the scientific literature and in the media, 24 BMJ EVID.-BASED MED. 231, 236 
(2019) (defining “evergreening” as “a strategy used by industry to effectively extend patent protection 
by making small changes to existing products, changes that have almost no added benefit to the 
patient”). 
 165.  Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & 
TECH. L. REV. 345, 354 (2007); see also Ouellette, How Many Patents, supra note 131, at 305 
(adopting Eisenberg definition). 
 166.  Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Creative Lawmaking: A Comment on Lionel Bently, Copyright, 
Translations, and Relations Between Britain and India in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth 
Centuries, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1243, 1247 (2007). 
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claims of patent protection indefinitely.”167 And another says 
“evergreening” means the “legal process of extending intellectual 
property protection by patenting ‘multiple aspects of, or incremental 
improvements to a single drug, so that the last patent expires well after the 
first.’”168 
Extending a drug’s patent life or patent term (singular noun). One 
scholar describes “evergreening” as “artificially extending the life of a 
patent or other exclusivity by obtaining additional protections to extend 
the monopoly period.”169 According to another, “‘evergreening’ 
strategies . . . artificially extend the date a medication officially goes off-
patent.”170 Two others write that “evergreening” is “making trivial and 
needless modifications to patented medicines in order to extend the term 
of patent protection or exclusivity.”171 
Or “effectively” doing so. One article says that “‘evergreening’ 
refers to attempts by owners of pharmaceutical product patents to 
effectively extend the term of those patents by obtaining related patents 
on modified forms of the same drug, new delivery systems for the drug, 
new uses of the drug, and the like.”172 According to another, 
 167.  Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., FTC v. Actavis: The Patent-Antitrust Intersection Revisited, 93 N.C. 
L. REV. 375, 420 n.198 (2015). 
 168.  Adamson, supra note 127, at 250 n.37; id. at 258 (“patent evergreening” involves making 
“minor variations to existing drugs to extend their patent coverage”); see also Jonathan D.M. Atkinson 
& Rachel S. Moodie, Legitimate Patent Extension or Patent System Abuse?, 2 PHARM. PAT. ANALYST 
317, 318 (2013) (“The term ‘evergreening’ is used to describe a variety of legal and business strategies 
by which patent proprietor extend their patent rights.”). 
 169.  Feldman, May Your Drug Price, supra note 126, at 596; see also Mrudula Bele & Aamar 
Latif, Exploring the Provisions for Precluding Patent Evergreening: Path Forward after the Glivec 
Saga 5 n.5 (WIPO Academy, University of Turin and ITC-ILO - Master of Laws in IP - Research 
Papers Collection, 2014), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2856909 [https://perma.cc/845C-LT9U] 
(defining evergreening as “a variety of legal and business strategies used by which the life of the 
patents which are about to expire is extended”). 
 170.  Christine D. Galbraith, Dying to Know: A Demand for Genuine Public Access to Clinical 
Trial Results Data, 78 MISS. L.J. 705, 759 (2009). 
 171.  Shannon Gibson & Barbara von Tigerstrom, Orphan drug incentives in the 
pharmacogenomic context: policy responses in the US and Canada, 2 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 263, 278 
(2015); see also Mohammed El-Said, The Morning After: TRIPS-Plus, FTAs, and WikiLeaks: Fresh 
Insights on the Implementation and Enforcement of IP Protection in Developing Countries, 28 AM. 
U. INT’L L. REV. 71, 90 (2012) (defining “evergreening” as securing patent protection on a new use 
of an already known and approved drug, “thereby extending the patent protection term substantially”). 
 172.  Janice M. Mueller & Donald S. Chisum, Enabling Patent Law’s Inherent Anticipation 
Doctrine, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1101, 1106 (2008); see also Daniel Gervais, The Patent Option, 20 N.C. 
J.L. & TECH. 357, 378 n.82 (2019) (quoting this definition); Inderjit Bansal et al., Evergreening—A 
Controversial Issue in Pharma Milieu, 14 J. INTELL. PROP. RTS. 299, 299 (2009) ( “evergreening” as 
“protecting a large number of inventive aspects over the basic invention” while “avoiding any 
imminent double patent rejection,” thus “leading to extension of patent terms to a further 20 year term 
for a single drug product”). 
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“evergreening” is a process by which companies “file additional uses for 
drugs whose patents are immediately expiring—thus triggering an 
additional twenty-year period for each use, extending the effective patent 
term of the underlying drug.”173 “Evergreening practices” adopted by 
companies, writes one legal scholar, are “various practices to extend the 
effective term of patent protection on their drugs.”174 Elsewhere he writes 
that “‘evergreening’ [is] a set of tactics used by firms to extend effective 
patent protection on a drug.”175 And in a third piece, he writes that 
“evergreening” means trying to “extend the effective patent protection on 
a product by acquiring ancillary patents that cover the commercial 
product, methods of use, or other aspects other than the product itself.”176 
Others say “‘evergreening’ [is] the practice of extending the effective life 
of drugs by successively patenting minor variants of them.”177 Another 
similarly writes that “evergreening of patents” means the “patenting of 
slight modifications that, in effect, extend the life of the original 
patent.”178 
Extending a drug’s exclusivity period or a company’s period of 
exclusive or proprietary control. According to one scholar, 
“evergreening” occurs when companies “attempt to extend the effective 
period of exclusivity of existing patents by patenting minor variations.”179 
Another claims that the term “refers generally to strategies that brand 
companies use to maintain exclusivities for their products.”180 Another 
writes that “evergreening” refers to “a wide range of pharmaceutical firm 
strategies for extending the exclusive market for a drug including . . . 
173.  Davis, Excluding Patentability, supra note 134, at 194.  
 174.  W. Nicholson Price II, The Cost of Novelty, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 40 (forthcoming 2020); 
see also Kristen C. Buteau, Note, Deuterated Drugs: Unexpectedly Nonobvious?, 10 J. HIGH TECH. 
L. 22, 66–67 n.269 (2009) (“‘Evergreening’ is a strategy whereby patentees try to prolong the 
effective market life of a pharmaceutical by filing for ‘secondary’ or ‘follow-on’ patents.”) (citing 
Michael Enzo Furrow, Pharmaceutical Patent Life-Cycle Management After KSR v. Teleflex, 63 
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 275, 277 (2008)). 
175.  W. Nicholson Price II, Making Do in Making Drugs: Innovation Policy and 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturing, 55 B.C. L. REV. 491, 522 (2014). 
176.  W. Nicholson Price II, Regulating Secrecy, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1769, 1777 n.43 (2016). 
 177.  Rochelle Dreyfuss & Esteban Donoso, On Aiding Technological Development: The Max 
Planck Declaration on Patent Protection, 6 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 321, 325 (2016). 
178.  Rudolf V. Van Puymbroeck, Beyond Sex: Legal Reform for HIV/AIDS and Poverty 
Reduction, 15 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 781, 815 (2008). 
 179.  Peter Lee, Reconceptualizing the Role of Intellectual Property Rights in Shaping Industry 
Structure, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1197, 1221 (2019); see also Jennifer D. Cieluch, The FTC Has A Dog 
in the Patent Monopoly Fight: Will Antitrust’s Bite Kill Generic Challenges?, 14 DUKE L. & TECH. 
REV. 1, 19 (2015) (stating that innovators “attempt to extend the patent exclusivity of their drugs” 
through “evergreening”—or “filing secondary patents”). 
 180.  Dmitry Karshtedt, The More Things Change: Improvement Patents, Drug Modifications 
and the FDA, 104 IOWA L. REV. 1129, 1215 n.491 (2019). 
32
Akron Law Review, Vol. 53 [2019], Iss. 4, Art. 2
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol53/iss4/2
2019] THE “EVERGREENING” METAPHOR 837 
patenting peripheral aspects of drugs, like their coating or normal 
metabolites, in order to extend market exclusivity.”181 “Market exclusivity 
extensions,” writes one scholar, can “occur via a process called ‘patent 
evergreening.’”182 Two others define “evergreening” as “extending the 
basic pharmaceutical protection with less innovative modifications that 
keep the drug under proprietary control for a longer period of time.”183 
And another maintains that “evergreening” occurs when “companies 
secure successive patents to extend the effective period of their exclusive 
control over a drug.”184 
3. Focus on the Market
Third, some writers also tie the term to objectives or results relating 
to power, pricing, revenue, or competition in the market. 
Market power. One scholar writes that “evergreening” refers to 
companies “extending their market power over drugs by filing newer 
patents covering related subject matter.”185 Another asserts that company 
“evergreening” strategies are “primarily designed merely to maintain their 
market dominance.”186 Another uses the term “evergreening” to refer to 
“practices aimed at prolonging an original product’s market power.”187 
Monopoly. According to one scholar, “evergreening” strategies are 
“efforts to extend the period of patent protections through incremental 
modifications” to a product, and they “may help maintain monopolies.”188 
Another defines “evergreening” as “the practice of taking out new patents 
 181.  Sam F. Halabi, The Drug Repurposing Ecosystem: Intellectual Property Incentives, 
Market Exclusivity, and the Future of “New” Medicines, 20 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1, 43 (2018); see also 
Saby Ghoshray, 3(d) View of India’s Patent Law: Social Justice Aspiration Meets Property Rights in 
Novartis v. Union of India & Others, 13 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 719, 722 n.2 (2014) 
(defining “evergreening” as “the slew of business strategies and legal maneuverings to extend market 
exclusivity of products, and in the process continuing to extract monopoly rent-seeking practices”). 
 182.  Aaron S. Kesselheim, Think Globally, Prescribe Locally: How Rational Pharmaceutical 
Policy in the U.S. Can Improve Global Access to Essential Medicines, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 125, 129 
(2008). 
 183.  Robert C. Bird & Daniel R. Cahoy, The Emerging BRIC Economies: Lessons from 
Intellectual Property Negotiation and Enforcement, 5 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 400, 417 (2007). 
 184.  Amy Kapczynski, Harmonization and Its Discontents: A Case Study of TRIPS 
Implementation in India’s Pharmaceutical Sector, 97 CAL. L. REV. 1571, 1590–91 (2009). 
 185.  Brian J. Love, An Empirical Study of Patent Litigation Timing: Could A Patent Term 
Reduction Decimate Trolls Without Harming Innovators?, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1309, 1351–52 (2013). 
 186.  Thomas Faunce et al., New Forms of Evergreening in Australia: Misleading Advertising, 
Enantiomers and Data Exclusivity: Apotex vs. Servier and Alphapharm vs. Lundbeck, 12 J.L. & 
MED. 220, 226 (2008). 
 187.  Yaniv Heled, Follow-on Biologics Are Set Up to Fail, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. ONLINE 113, 
132 n.103 (2018). 
188.  Baker, Ending Drug Registration Apartheid, supra note 128, at 304. 
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on existing medicines in order to maintain monopolies.”189 Another paper 
describes “evergreening” as a “phenomenon . . . in which a company tries 
to refresh its market monopoly by making slight modifications to the 
delivery mechanism, dosage, or other characteristics” of its drug “to make 
the drug eligible for additional patents or exclusivity.”190 Another 
describes it as “the strategic small improvements made by producers of 
small molecule drugs in an attempt to extend their market monopoly.”191 
One article reports that “evergreening” is “trying to refresh one’s 
monopoly protection on a drug.”192 A group of scholars claim in their 
article that “evergreening” is “extending the market monopoly on a drug 
facing originating patent expiration through listing of further relevant 
patents on the patent register for minor modifications to the marketed 
drug.”193 Another scholar says that “evergreening” is companies “making 
relatively minor changes to existing products in order to restart their 
monopoly protection clocks.”194 And another defines “evergreening” as 
“patenting an incremental aspect of a preexisting technology to unduly 
extend the monopoly lifetime of the underlying technology.”195 
Monopoly privileges. According to one article, “evergreening” is 
“best understood as a social idea used to refer to the myriad ways in which 
pharmaceutical patent owners utilize the law and related regulatory 
processes to extend their high rent-earning intellectual monopoly 
privileges, particularly over highly profitable (either in total sales volume 
or price per unit) ‘blockbuster’ drugs.”196 Another says “evergreening” 
refers to the “numerous strategies whereby owners of pharmaceutical 
 189.  Lisa Forman, The Inadequate Global Policy Response to Trade-Related Intellectual 
Property Rights: Impact on Access to Medicines in Low- and Middle-Income Countries, 31 MD. J. 
INT’L L. 8, 13 (2016). 
190.  Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 157, at 527. 
 191.  Janet Freilich, Patent Infringement in the Context of Follow-on Biologics, 16 STAN. TECH. 
L. REV. 9, 23 (2012). 
192.  Feldman, May Your Drug Price, supra note 126, at 601. 
193.  Ron A. Bouchard, Jamil Sawani, Chris McLelland, Monika Sawicka & Richard W. 
Hawkins, The Pas De Deux of Pharmaceutical Regulation and Innovation: Who’s Leading Whom?, 
24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1461, 1501 (2009) (discussing “evergreening” in Canada). 
 194.  Yaniv Heled, Patents vs. Statutory Exclusivities in Biological Pharmaceuticals—Do We 
Really Need Both?, 18 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 419, 462 n.198 (2012) (quoting definition 
in Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Clearing the Way to Low-Cost Biogenerics, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 26, 2008). 
 195.  David Orozco, Administrative Patent Levers, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 1, 15 (2012); see also 
David Orozco, Legal Knowledge as an Intellectual Property Management Resource, 47 AM. BUS. 
L.J. 687, 724 (2010) (stating that some drug companies have “extended the lifetime monopoly of their 
patented compounds by engaging in ‘evergreening’ practices, including patenting minor variants of 
the compound or delivery processes that extend the lifetime of the original compound”). 
196.  Faunce & Lexchin, supra note 122, at 1. 
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products use patent laws and minor drug modifications to extend their 
monopoly privileges on the drug.”197 
High pricing and revenue. Some scholars say “evergreening” refers 
to the “strategic methods by which an originator company protects the 
royalties flowing from an original patent over an active pharmaceutical 
substance.”198 One explains that “evergreening” entails “adding ‘bells and 
whistles’ to existing products on which older new-chemical-entity patents 
have since expired, thus allowing for continued monopoly pricing.”199 
Two write that “evergreening” refers to patenting “very similar 
compounds to extend the patent period so that” a company “can continue 
charging high prices beyond the initial patent period.”200 According to 
another, “evergreening” “typically refer[s] to a variety of practices of 
brand-name pharmaceutical manufacturers aimed at extending exclusivity 
periods for their products to maintain their revenue streams.”201 And 
another declares that “evergreening” is “[t]he process of patenting subtle 
improvements on a drug,” and “[i]t helps drug makers ensure a continued 
stream of revenue when the patents on their drugs expire.”202 
A period without generic competition. One scholar says that “patent 
evergreening” occurs when “manufacturers seek and receive patents on 
peripheral features of drug products, including a pill’s coating or a 
naturally-occurring metabolite of a drug, that can serve to block others 
from producing generic versions of the underlying active ingredient.”203 
Another describes “evergreening” as “making minor modifications to 
existing drug patents in order to avoid facing generic competition as the 
basic patent on a drug expires.”204 With a coauthor, this same scholar also 
describes “evergreening” as using the continuation process to obtain 
“multiple patents covering obvious variants of the same drug” and then 
 197.  Ali Alkhafaji et al., Impact of evergreening on patients and health insurance: a meta 
analysis and reimbursement cost analysis of citalopram/escitalopram antidepressants, 10 BMC 
MED. 142, November 20, 2012, at 1 (2012); see also Molly F.M. Chen, Note, Reconsidering the U.S. 
Patent System: Lessons from Generics, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 1249, 1252 (2012) (“The United 
States, by supporting ‘follow-on’ patents and evergreening practices, has allowed pharmaceutical 
giants to effectively extend their monopolies on brand-name drugs.”). 
198.  Faunce, New Forms of Evergreening, supra note 186, at 222. 
 199.  Ron A. Bouchard, Balancing Public and Private Interests in the Commercialization of 
Publicly Funded Medical Research: Is There A Role for Compulsory Government Royalty Fees?, 13 
B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 120, 178 (2007). 
200.  James Gathii & Cynthia Ho, Regime Shifting of IP Lawmaking and Enforcement from the 
WTO to the International Investment Regime, 18 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 427, 461–62 (2017). 
201.  Heled, Regulatory Competitive Shelters, supra note 132, at 341 n.177. 
 202.  Mason Marks, Psychedelic Medicine for Mental Illness and Substance Use Disorders: 
Overcoming Social and Legal Obstacles, 21 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 69, 106 (2018). 
203.  Kesselheim, Think Globally, supra note 182, at 129. 
204.  Lemley, Expecting the Unexpected, supra note 133, at 1393. 
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listing the patents in the ORANGE BOOK at “different times,” thus 
obtaining “many sequential thirty-month stays” of generic approval.205 
Two scholars maintain that “evergreening” is “the use of multiple patents 
to delay the appearance of a generic product on the market and 
accordingly prolong the brand’s patent monopoly.”206 A group defines 
“‘[e]vergreening’ [as] a strategy wherein an innovative pharmaceutical 
firm introduces an upgrade of its current product when the product on this 
patent expires,” and “[t]he upgrade is introduced with a new patent and is 
designed to counter competition from generic manufacturers that seek to 
imitate the firm’s existing product.”207 And finally, another article 
describes “evergreening [as] a process whereby the holder of the patents 
for a biologic drug, using incremental changes to its original product, is 
able to shift the market to a newer product so as to limit a generic 
competitor’s market opportunity.”208 
B. Examples Offered 
Legal scholars cite roughly three dozen examples of what they call 
“evergreening” in the United States since the enactment of the generic 
drug approval provisions in 1984.209 A review of the facts underlying 
 205.  Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent Continuations, 84 B.U. 
L. REV. 63, 82 (2004). The law permitted sequential stays when Profs. Lemley and Moore wrote this 
article, but Congress amended the statute in December 2003. See authorities cited supra note 84 and 
accompanying text. See also Stephanie Plamondon Bair, Adjustments, Extensions, Disclaimers, and 
Continuations: When Do Patent Term Adjustments Make Sense?, 41 CAP. U.L. REV. 445 (2013) 
(using “evergreening” to mean the practice of securing sequential 30-month stays but noting that the 
practice effectively ended with the legislative amendments of 2003). 
 206.  Emir Aly Crowne & Cristina Mihalceanu, Innovators and Generics: Proposals for 
Balancing Pharmaceutical Patent Protection and Public Access to Cheaper Medicines in Canada 
(or, Don’t NOC the Players, Hate the Regulations), 51 IDEA 693, 707 (2011). 
 207.  Ram Bala, et al., Evergreening and Operational Risk Under Price Competition 1, 36 (Jan. 
9, 2012), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2354125 [https://perma.cc/RHQ9-PXG7]; see also Alexandra E. 
Blasi, An Ethical Dilemma: Patents & Profits v. Access & Affordability, 33 J. LEG. MED. 115, 119 
(2012) (evergreening is an “art form of getting, protecting, keeping, and extending their patents” that 
“substantially delays the entry of generic drugs into the market”); John Altin, Pharmacogenomics: A 
New Frontier for the Evergreening of Pharmaceutical Drugs 5 (ANU College of Law Research Paper 
No. 08-04, Oct. 2007), https://ssrn.com/ abstract=1129064 [https://perma.cc/L7GN-SBZT] (defining 
evergreening as “the various strategies that originators use to extend the period for which their 
blockbuster drugs remain free from generic competition beyond the expiration of their base patents”). 
 208.  Heled, Patents vs. Statutory Exclusivities, supra note 194, at 462 n.198 (quoting definition 
offered in Alex M. Brill, Proper Duration of Data Exclusivity for Generic Biologics: A Critique 11 
(2008) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author)). 
 209.  The medical, scientific, and economic literature adds examples, but for brevity’s sake this 
Article focuses mainly on examples offered by legal scholars in law journals and their equivalent. 
And much of the literature is global in focus and includes examples irrelevant in the United States, 
which this Article excludes. E.g., Sandeep Rathod, Ever-Greening: A Status Check in Selected 
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these examples indicates many involve an innovator introducing a new 
medicine, patenting another innovation, introducing a new product that 
corresponds to the innovation, and perhaps discontinuing its older 
product. It is rare to see a discussion of the full factual and legal landscape 
in which an example arises, however. For instance, the literature generally 
will not describe the kinds of products containing the active ingredient 
that a generic company could have sought to market (its room to operate), 
whether any generic companies actually marketed copies (or variations) 
of the innovator’s first approved product, whether and why doctors chose 
(or did not choose) the innovator’s newer product, and whether and how 
payers responded to the innovator’s new product. 
1. New Products
New dosage forms. Many scholars offer, as examples of 
“evergreening,” instances in which an innovator introduced a new dosage 
form (a capsule after a tablet, for example, or an extended release product 
after an immediate release product).210 They most often cite Asacol 
(mesalamine) (delayed release tablets, then delayed release capsules),211 
Countries, 7 J. GENERIC MED. 227, 229 n.7 (2010) (discussing Lunesta (eszopiclone), an enantiomer 
of zopiclone, though FDA never approved a product containing zopiclone, and discussing a patent 
claiming crystalline forms of atorvastatin, marketed in the United States as Lipitor, though FDA never 
approved a product containing the crystalline form). 
This Article also excludes two examples in the literature that do not correspond to actual approved 
products. First, many articles discuss Gleevec (imatinib mesylate), a salt of imatinib, presumably 
because Indian authorities rejected a patent on the salt due to the earlier patenting of imatinib. E.g., 
Abbott, Balancing Access, supra note 142, at 343–45; Halabi, Multipolarity, supra note 146, at 757. 
But FDA never approved an application for a product containing imatinib (nor did the Indian 
authorities). Second, another article mentions the development of torcetrapib on the heels of Lipitor 
(atorvastatin), perhaps because Pfizer was considering the introduction of a fixed-dose-combination 
of the two active ingredients together. The active ingredients were unrelated, however, and torcetrapib 
failed in clinical trials. Faunce & Lexchin, supra note 122, at 188. See also Bala, supra note 207, at 
2 (characterizing torcetrapib as an “upgrade” to atorvastatin that failed due to its toxicity). 
 210.  Many call the latter “reformulation,” but FDA classifies them as new dosage forms. 
ORANGE BOOK, supra note 43, at Appendix C. This matters because FDA often requires a separate 
marketing application for a new dosage form. See infra Part IV.B. 
 211.  Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 157, at 530. FDA approved Asacol, which were delayed 
release tablets, in 1992. Approval dates in this Part of the Article are taken from Drugs@FDA. Asacol 
was not the first approved drug containing mesalamine; FDA had approved another company’s 
Rowasa (mesalamine) in 1987. In 2013, the company selling Asacol launched Delzicol (mesalamine), 
which were delayed release capsules. FDA did not approve the first generic tablets until 2017, 25 
years after approval of Asacol, in part due to uncertainty about how generic companies would show 
bioequivalence to Asacol. FDA Reverses Stance on Bioequivalence Standards for Mesalamine, PINK 
SHEET (Aug. 30, 2010), https://pink.pharmaintelligence.informa.com/PS052561/FDA-Reverses-
Stance-On-Bioequivalence-Standards-For-Mesalamine [https://perma.cc/YV63-RK2T]. By then, 
though, FDA had approved generic copies of Rowasa (2004) and another innovator’s delayed release 
mesalamine tablets (2007). 
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Buspar (buspirone hydrochloride) (tablets, then capsules),212 Doryx 
(doxycycline hyclate) (tablets, then capsules, and scoring lines on 
tablets),213 Glucophage (metformin hydrochloride) (immediate release, 
then extended release),214 Loestrin (ethinyl estradiol and norethindrone 
acetate) (tablets, then chewable tablets),215 Namenda (memantime 
hydrochloride) (immediate release, then extended release),216 Oxycontin 
(oxycodone hydrochloride) (extended release tablets, then new extended 
release tablets that were more abuse resistant),217 Prozac (fluoxetine 
 212.  Carrier, Real-World Analysis, supra note 152, at 1016. FDA approved Buspar (buspirone 
hydrochloride) oral tablets in 1986. FDA approved a capsule dosage form in 2000. 
 213.  Feldman, May Your Drug Price, supra note 126, at 608 n.87 (focusing on the adding of 
scoring lines on the tablet); Jorge Lemus & Olga Ozkul, Product Hopping and Innovation Incentives 
(March 20, 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3275815 [https://perma.cc/6FLA-VADE] (referring to a 
switch “from tablet to capsules”). Immediate release doxycycline had been available since the 1960s, 
when Mayne launched Doryx—extended release capsules—in 1985. Twenty years later, in 2005, 
Warner Chilcott (which had an arrangement with Mayne) launched delayed release tablets, and in 
2008 it launched a scored tablet—a tablet with a groove down the middle, which makes it easier for 
patients to split the dose in half. Eventually the company introduced tablets with multiple scores that 
could be split in half or in thirds. See generally Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Ltd., Civ. 
No. 12-3824, 2015 WL 1736957, *2–*5 (E.D. Penn. Apr. 15, 2015) (describing the history), aff’d, 
838 F.3d 421, 441–42 (3d Cir. 2016). 
 214.  Halabi, The Drug Repurposing Ecosystem, supra note 181, at 49 (creating “improved 
formulations”); see also Joli Patel, Comment, India’s Crack Down on the Practice of Pharmaceutical 
Evergreening: The 2013 Novartis Decision, 85 UMKC L. REV. 503, 506 (2017) (sustained release). 
FDA approved Glucophage immediate release oral tablets in March 1995. It approved Glucophage 
XR extended release tablets in October 2000. 
 215.  Erik Hovenkamp & Jorge Lemus, Delayed Entry Settlements at the Patent Office, 54 INT’L 
REV. L. & ECON. 30, 45 (2018) (“switching over to the chewable form”). The first ethinyl estradiol 
marketing application took effect in the 1940s, and the first application for a combination of ethinyl 
estradiol and norethindrone acetate took effect in 1961. FDA approved Loestrin in 1972. In 2013, 
FDA approved an application from the same company for a chewable tablet formulation, which the 
company markets as Minastrin. 
 216.  Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 157, at 531–32 (introduction of extended release dosage 
form); Feldman, May Your Drug Price, supra note 126, at 602–03 (same); Cynthia M. Ho, Should 
All Drugs Be Patentable?: A Comparative Perspective, 17 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 295, 320 (2015); 
Lemus & Ozkul, supra note 213 (same); Price, The Cost of Novelty, supra note 174, at 41 (same); see 
also Gregory Jones, Michael Carrier, Richard Silver & Hagop Kantarjian, Strategies that delay or 
prevent the timely availability of affordable generic drugs in the United States, 127 BLOOD 1398 
(2016) (same). FDA approved Namenda immediate release tablets in 2003 and Namenda XR 
extended release capsules in 2010. 
 217.  Lemus & Ozkul, supra note 213. See also Jaime F. Cárdenas-Navia, Thirty Years of 
Flawed Incentives: An Empirical and Economic Analysis of Hatch-Waxman Patent-Term 
Restoration, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1301, 1339 (2014). In November 2007, Purdue Pharma applied 
for approval of reformulated controlled release tablets that would be less easily compromised by 
tampering than its earlier marketed formulation. See FDA, APPLICATION NUMBER: 22-272 SUMMARY 
REVIEW (Apr. 5, 2010), https://accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/nda/2010/
0222272s000SumR.pdf [https://perma.cc/BE58-Q8AJ]. When FDA approved the new “Oxycontin 
OP” tablets, it determined that, for safety reasons, it would not accept or approve ANDAs relying on 
the older and less abuse-resistant products the innovator had marketed before. See FDA, FDA Actions 
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hydrochloride) (capsules, then tablets, then extended release),218 
Suboxone (buprenorphine hydrochloride and naloxone hydrochloride) 
(sublingual tablets, then sublingual film),219 and Tricor (fenofibrate) 
(capsules, then tablets).220 One article mentions Ambien (zolpidem 
tartrate) (immediate release tablets, then extended release tablets) when 
discussing “evergreening” in another country, but the same products were 
introduced here.221 
New active ingredients. Some articles cite new products containing 
active ingredients that relate to the active ingredient in the innovator’s first 
product. Several cite subsequent products containing metabolites: Claritin 
(loratadine) and Clarinex (desloratadine),222 as well as Effexor 
(venlafaxine hydrochloride) and Pristiq (desvenlafaxine succinate).223 
Others mention the introduction of a left-handed or right-handed molecule 
(enantiomer) after the marketing of an active ingredient containing a 
mixture of both (racemate). The examples offered are: Celexa 
on OxyContin Products (Apr. 16, 2013), https://www.fda.gov/drugs/information-drug-class/fda-
actions-oxycotin-products-4162013 [https://perma.cc/6ZWH-YYKZ]. 
 218.  Carrier, Real-World Analysis, supra note 152, at 1017 (capsule to tablet); see also 
Patel, India’s Crack Down, supra note 214, at 506 (sustained release). FDA approved Prozac capsules 
first in 1987; it approved tablets in 1999; and it approved oral delayed release pellets in 2001. 
 219.  Feldman, May Your Drug Price, supra note 126, at 608 n.87 (“new film version”); Lemus 
& Ozkul, supra note 213 (sublingual film). Although each active ingredient had been marketed 
previously, FDA approved the new fixed dose combination product in 2002. FDA, Ever Approved 
Drug List (on file with author). The company’s initial product was a sublingual tablet. In 2010, FDA 
approved a sublingual film. 
 220.  Carrier, Real-World Analysis, supra note 152, at 1017 (tablet); Mohammed K. El-
Said, TRIPS-Plus, Public Health and Performance-Based Rewards Schemes Options and 
Supplements for Policy Formation in Developing and Least Developed Countries, 31 AM. U. INT’L 
L. REV. 373, 395–97 (2016); Feldman, May Your Drug Price, supra note 126, at 608 n.87; Ho, Should 
All Drugs, supra note 216, at 320; Lemus & Ozkul, supra note 213, at 3; Lim, Self-Replicating 
Technologies, supra note 133, at 218. For a discussion of the sequence of introduced fenofibrate 
products, see Nicholas S. Downing et al., How Abbott’s Fenofibrate Franchise Avoided Generic 
Competition, 172 ARCH. INTERN. MED. 724, 276 (2012). 
 221.  Nathalie Vernaz et al., Patented Drug Extension Strategies on Healthcare Spending: A 
Cost-Evaluation Analysis, 10 PLOS MED. 6, June 2013, at 2. FDA approved Ambien in 1992 and 
Ambien CR in 2005. 
 222.  Carrier, Real-World Analysis, supra note 152, at 1017; Noah, Product Hopping, supra note 
144, at 166 n.5. See also Bansal, supra note 172, at 300. FDA approved Claritin in 1992 and Clarinex 
in 2001. 
 223.  Price, The Cost of Novelty, supra note 174, at 40; see also Lehman & Wojnowicz, infra 
note 224, at 387; Hazel Moir, Exploring evergreening: Insights from two medicines, 49 AUS. ECON. 
REV. 413, 420–24 (2016). FDA approved Effexor in 1993 and Pristiq in 2008. Pristiq tablets are an 
extended release formulation of the major active metabolite of Effexor. FDA, APPLICATION NUMBER: 
21-992 MEDICAL REVIEW(S) 2 (Feb. 5, 2008), https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/
drugsatfda_docs/nda/2008/021992s000_MedR_P1.pdf [https://perma.cc/2MH6-GLQS]. 
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(citalopram) and Lexapro (escitalopram),224 Prevacid (lansoprazole) and 
Dexilant (dexlansoprazole),225 Prilosec (omeprazole) and Nexium 
(esomeprazole),226 Provigil (modafinil) and Nuvigil (armodafinil),227 
Ritalin (methylphenidate hydrochloride) and Focalin 
(dexmethylphenidate hydrochloride),228 and Zyrtec (cetirizine) and Xyzal 
(levocetirizine).229 Finally, some cite Neurontin (gabapentin) and Lyrica 
(pregabalin), which are structurally similar because both relate to a human 
neurotransmitter, though they are not directly related to each other.230 
New Fixed-Dose Combination Products. A few scholars refer to 
fixed dose combination products. They cite Azor (amlodipine besylate 
and olmesartan medoxomil),231 Caduet (amlodipine besylate and 
 224.  Carrier, Real-World Analysis, supra note 152, at 1017; Marks, Psychedelic Medicine, 
supra note 202, at 106; see also David F. Lehman & Sarabeth Wojnowicz, The Evergreening of 
Biopharmaceuticals: Time to Defoliate, 56 J. CLIN. PHARM. 383, 384 (2015). FDA approved Celexa 
in 1998 and Lexapro in 2002. Escitalopram is an enantiomer of citalopram. 
 225.  E.g., Carrier, Real-World Analysis, supra note 152, at 1017 (referring to Prevacid and 
“Kapidex,” which was the original name for Dexilant); see also Lehman & Wojnowicz, supra note 
224, at 386. FDA approved Prevacid in 1995 and Dexilant in 2009. Dexlansoprazole is an enantiomer 
of lansoprazole. 
 226.  Adamson, supra note 127, at 259; Bouchard, The Pas De Deux, supra note 193, at 1502; 
Price, The Cost of Novelty, supra note 174, at 40; McCarthy, Pharma Barons, supra note 153, at 53; 
see also Dutfield, supra note 122, at 466; Bansal, supra note 172, at 302. FDA approved Prilosec in 
1989 and Nexium in 2001. Esomeprazole is an enantiomer of omeprazole. 
 227.  Jones, supra note 216, at 1400; see also Rathod, supra note 209. FDA approved Provigil 
in 1998 and Nuvigil in 2007. Armodafinil is an enantiomer of modafinil. 
 228.  E.g., Sean Dickson, Effect of Evergreened Reformulations on Medicaid Expenditures and 
Patient Access from 2008 to 2016, 25 J. MANAG. CARE SPEC. PHARM. 780, 785 (2019). 
Methylphenidate is a racemic mixture and has been marketed for decades by various companies under 
various brand names, including Ritalin, Concerta, and Metadate. FDA, APPLICATION NUMBER: 21-
278 ADMINISTRATIVE DOCUMENTS 23 (2001), https://accessdata.fda.gov/
drugsatfda_docs/nda/2001/21-278_Focalin_admindocs.pdf [https://perma.cc/ER4L-P2AV]. FDA 
approved Focalin (dexmethylphenidate) in 2001. Dexmethylphenidate is an enantiomer of 
methylphenidate. 
 229.  Lehman & Wojnowicz, supra note 224, at 387; see also Vernaz, supra note 221, at *2 
(discussing these examples in Geneva). FDA approved Zyrtec in 1995 and Xyzal in 2007. 
Levocetirizine is an enantiomer of cetirizine. 
 230.  Jeremy A. Greene & Kevin Riggs, Why Is There No Generic Insulin? Historical Origins 
of a Modern Problem, 372 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1171, 1173 (2015) (“after Pfizer lost patent exclusivity 
on the antiepileptic agent gabapentin (Neurontin) in 2004, it retained a healthy share of the market 
through patents on a metabolic cognate, pregabalin (Lyrica)”); see also Vernaz, supra note 221, at 2 
(discussing gabapentin and pregabalin in Geneva). FDA approved Neurontin in 1993 and Lyrica in 
2004. The active ingredients are gabapentinoids. See generally H. Brockbrader et al., A comparison 
of the pharmacokinetics and pharmacodynamics of pregabalin and gabapentin, 49 CLIN. 
PHARMACOKINETICS 661 (2010). 
231.  Carrier, Real-World Analysis, supra note 152, at 1017. 
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atorvastatin calcium),232 Exforge (amlodipine besylate and valsartan),233 
Treximet (naproxen sodium and sumatriptan succinate),234 and Ultracet 
(acetaminophen and tramadol hydrochloride).235 In each case, the active 
ingredients had been marketed separately before being offered in a 
combination product. 
2. Other Examples
The preceding examples involve new products that are usually 
(though perhaps not in every case) protected by new patents and perhaps 
new statutory exclusivity. And, as noted, many scholars define 
“evergreening” as just that.236 But the remaining examples are harder to 
categorize. 
A few articles cite patents claiming new methods of using approved 
drugs.237 One points to a patent that claimed a new method of using 
gemcitabine (the active ingredient of Gemzar) in the treatment of 
cancer.238 Another article points to a patent claiming “pharmaco-
kinetic/therapeutic parameters” associated with venlafaxine (the active 
ingredient of Effexor).239 That article also states that “evergreening” 
occurs through patents claiming impurities or substantially pure 
compounds, adding that a patent claiming lamotrigine (the active 
ingredient of Lamictal) fell into the latter category.240 Others consider the 
 232.  Hazel Moir & Luigi Palombi, Patents and Trademarks: Empirical Evidence on 
“Evergreening” from Australia 33 (December 7, 2013), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2365786 
[https://perma.cc/R93N-ULN7]. The authors refer to the introduction of Caduet in Australia, but the 
same combination was also introduced in the United States. 
233.  Carrier, Real-World Analysis, supra note 152, at 1017. 
234.  Id. 
235.  Kevin Outterson, Death from the Public Domain?, 87 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 45, 50 
(2009) (“Ultracet could be characterized as an attempt to evergreen 50 mg Ultram by reducing the 
dose to 37.5 mg and combining it with 325mg of acetaminophen.”). 
236.  See supra Part III.A.1. 
 237.  Some examples relate to the first use that FDA approved, however. One article points to 
the patent claiming use of sildenafil (the active ingredient of Viagra) for treatment of erectile 
dysfunction, even though this was the first use for which the drug was approved. Rathod, supra note 
209, at 229 n.11. It also points to a patent claiming treatment of a “segmented patient population” 
with BiDil (isosorbide dinitrate and hydralazine hydrochloride), though the drug was proven safe and 
effective in, and approved only for, that patient subpopulation. Id. at 229 n.229. 
238.  Noah, Product Hopping, supra note 144, at 166 n.5. 
239.  Rathod, supra note 209, at 229 n.12. 
240.  Id. at 229 n.10. 
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patent claiming the coating of omeprazole to be an instance of 
evergreening.241 
A few other examples offered by scholars are difficult to interpret. 
One article points to the fact that the manufacturers of Claritin (loratadine) 
and Glucophage (metformin) “petitioned Congress for extended market 
exclusivity based on” the “marketing exclusivity regimes administered by 
FDA.”242 The author does not elaborate. The reference to Glucophage 
may reflect a debate about the relationship between pediatric exclusivity 
and three-year condition of approval exclusivity.243 The reference to 
Claritin probably reflects Schering-Plough’s efforts to persuade Congress 
that the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) should extend patents 
for a small group of drugs that experienced unusual delays during FDA 
reviews of their marketing applications.244 In describing “evergreening,” 
that article also refers to a “legal technicality” that gave Zantac (ranitidine 
hydrochloride) “seven more years of market protection,” which appears 
to refer to a Federal Circuit ruling that rejected an invalidity challenge.245 
 241.  Amin & Kesselheim, supra note 122, at 2287; Moir & Palombi, supra note 232, at 46–47. 
Although this patent—U.S. Patent No. 4,786,505—issued and expired later than the active ingredient 
patent, it covered the first approved omeprazole product. 
242.  Halabi, The Drug Repurposing Ecosystem, supra note 181, at 43. 
 243.  Bristol Myers-Squibb submitted a supplemental application for use of metformin by 
teenagers, which FDA approved in December 2000. The company had earned three-year exclusivity 
under the 1984 statute and assumed it was also entitled to a six-month extension (to that three years) 
under the pediatric exclusivity provisions. When Congress reauthorized pediatric exclusivity in 2001, 
however, it added a provision—largely understood as targeting Glucophage—that (1) allowed 
approval of a generic drug when the innovator has received a new pediatric indication protected by 
patent or exclusivity, (2) authorized omission of the pediatric indication, and (3) authorized special 
labeling that alerts doctors to the off-label pediatric use and provides information needed for safe 
prescribing. 21 U.S.C. § 355a(o). See generally Glucophage Provision in HR 2887 Could Be Breach 
of Contract—Bristol, PINK SHEET (Nov. 19, 2001), 
https://pink.pharmaintelligence.informa.com/PS038862/Glucophage-Provision-In-HR-2887-Could-
Be-Breach-Of-Contract—Bristol [https://perma.cc/CE8J-9WFU]; Pediatric Exclusivity Bill Passes; 
CBO Scoring Flawed, Rep. Tauzin Says, PINK SHEET (Nov. 26, 2001), 
https://pink.pharmaintelligence.informa.com/PS093315/Pediatric-Exclusivity-Bill-Passes-CBO-
Scoring-Flawed-Rep-Tauzin-Says [https://perma.cc/BRE6-BTFG]; Glucophage Exclusivity 
Compromise Could Resolve Pediatric Bill Delay, PINK SHEET (Dec. 3, 2001), 
https://pink.pharmaintelligence.informa.com/PS038930/Glucophage-Exclusivity-Compromise-
Could-Resolve-Pediatric-Bill-Delay [https://perma.cc/LS4Z-QHYY]; Glucophage Provision Likely 
to Remain in Final Pediatric Exclusivity Bill, PINK SHEET (Dec. 10, 2001), 
https://pink.pharmaintelligence.informa.com/PS038966/Glucophage-Provision-Likely-To-Remain-
In-Final-Pediatric-Exclusivity-Bill [https://perma.cc/7EQS-Y56N]. 
 244.  See Claritin Extension Should Be Debated as Product-Specific Bill—Barr CEO, PINK 
SHEET (May 25, 1998), https://pink.pharmaintelligence.informa.com/pS032218/Claritin-Extension-
Should-Be-Debated-As-Product-Specific-Bill—Barr-CEO [https://perma.cc/4WHK-FAY2]. 
 245.  Halabi, The Drug Repurposing Ecosystem, supra note 181, at 43 (citing Glaxo Patent on 
Zantac Gets Extension, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 1995), https://nytimes.com/1995/04/22/business/glaxo-
patent-on-zantac-gets-extension.html [https://perma.cc/YQ66-PC3Z] (noting that the Federal Circuit 
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Finally, some examples offered by scholars reflect law that has since 
changed. For example, some articles discuss the patents listed in the 
ORANGE BOOK for Paxil (paroxetine).246 Several issued while generic 
applications were pending before FDA. A generic company must address 
any patent that issues while its application is under review, even if there 
is already a 30-month stay of approval in place.247 At the time, if a generic 
company submitted a paragraph IV certification, a new patent 
infringement suit led to a new 30-month stay. Here, there were five 
overlapping stays. Congress amended the statute nearly two decades ago, 
however, making it unlikely that approval will be stayed more than 
once.248 
rejected Novopharm’s argument that the Zantac patent was invalid). See Glaxo Inc. v. Novopharm 
Ltd., 52 F.3d 1043 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (rejecting anticipation, best mode, and inequitable conduct 
arguments). The patent at issue—U.S. Patent No. 4,521,431—issued in June 1985 on an application 
filed in August 1982. It was slated to expire in 2002. This led the New York Times to write in 1995 
that the court’s ruling protected Zantac “for seven more years.” But, to be clear, the court’s ruling 
simply meant that the patent would expire as scheduled, after an ordinary 20-year term, seven years 
after the reporter was writing. 
 246.  E.g., Michael A. Carrier & Carl J. Minniti III, Biologics: The New Antitrust Frontier, 2018 
U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 34 (2018); Halabi, The Drug Repurposing Ecosystem, supra note 181, at 43; C. 
Scott Hemphill & Mark A. Lemley, Earning Exclusivity: Generic Drug Incentives and the Hatch-
Waxman Act, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 947, 959 (2011); see also Bansal, supra note 172, at 304–05. 
247.  21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(12)(viii)(C)(1)(ii) (2020). 
 248.  See authorities cited supra note 84 and accompanying text. Most who discuss Paxil note 
that the law has changed. E.g., Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust Law and Regulatory 
Gaming, 87 TEX. L. REV. 685, 711 n.111 (2009) (describing the “tactic” of sequentially listing patents 
in the ORANGE BOOK to trigger sequential 30-month stays and noting that Congress amended the 
Hatch-Waxman scheme in 2003 “to eliminate this particular form of patent evergreening”); 
Flynn, supra note 130, at 178 (stating that sequential 30-month stays under the pre-2003 Hatch-
Waxman provisions were a type of evergreening, but adding that U.S. law now limits patent holders 
to one stay); Hemphill & Lemley, supra note 246, at 959–60 (discussing overlapping stays associated 
with patents listed for Paxil that “stretched out over sixty-five months” and adding that after 2003 
changes to the statute “evergreening of this form won’t work for new cases”); Herbert Hovenkamp et 
al., Balancing Ease and Accuracy in Assessing Pharmaceutical Exclusion Payments, 88 MINN. L. 
REV. 712, 716 n.17 (2004) (noting that FDA changed its regulations in 2003 “to permit no more than 
one thirty-month stay,” which is correct, but Congress changed the law after this, and the change—
which was different—superseded the regulations); Arti K. Rai, Building A Better Innovation System: 
Combining Facially Neutral Patent Standards with Therapeutics Regulation, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1037, 
1049 (2008) (noting that before 2003, drug companies could “string together sequential thirty-month 
stays based on multiple patents,” which was an “evergreening” practice and “curtailed to some extent” 
by changes in the law). 
Some do not. E.g., Erik Hovenkamp & Jorge Lemus, Delayed Entry Settlements at the Patent Office, 
54 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 30, 35 (2018) (stating that “drug companies may strategically list additional 
patents in the ORANGE BOOK over time, with each new addition triggering an additional 30-month 
stay on generic approval pending litigation—a practice known as evergreening”). 
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Another article gives the example of the Cabilly patents, which 
claimed basic technologies used to artificially synthesize antibodies.249 
Companies developing and marketing monoclonal antibodies for medical 
use had to pay licensing fees to the patent owner for years. The author 
focuses on the fact that the patent owner filed continuation applications 
with the PTO, and the patents issuing on those applications expired much 
later than the patent issued on its original application.250 The law 
governing patent terms changed in the mid-1990s, however, and 
continuation patents no longer expire later than their original parent 
patent.251 
C. Empirical Studies Offered 
Some scholars have published empirical studies that they, or others, 
say support allegations of “evergreening.” Many use datasets from other 
countries, however, and these are governed by different drug approval 
frameworks, patent laws, pricing and reimbursement arrangements, and 
advertising and promotion laws and practices.252 The empirical work 
considering the U.S. market falls in three categories. Some scholars count 
patents and exclusivities associated with drugs; some examine litigation 
challenging innovator patents; and some calculate spending associated 
with the newer products introduced by innovators. 
1. Counting Patents and Exclusivities
Several articles count patents and exclusivities associated with drugs. 
Four articles examine patents alone. The most significant study considers 
the 1,304 patents listed in the ORANGE BOOK for the 528 new molecular 
entities approved by FDA between 1988 and 2005.253 Not all new 
 249.  Holman, Biotechnology’s Prescription, supra note 131, at 333 (discussing use of 
continuation practices to “evergreen protection for some of the fundamental enabling technologies of 
biotechnology,” citing the Cabilly patents, and calling MedImmune the “victim of this particular 
evergreening”). 
250.  Id. 
 251.  See also Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Problem of New Uses, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & 
ETHICS 717, 723 n.20 (2005) (asserting that the 17-year patent term in place before 1995 permitted 
drug companies to prosecute patents “lethargically” in order to “defer issuance and prolong the period 
of patent protection” and referring to this as an “evergreening strategy”). 
252.  E.g., Alkhafaji, supra note 197 (France); Bouchard, Empirical Analysis, supra note 149 
(Canada); Christie, supra note 132 (Australia); Hazel Moir et al., Assessing the impact of alternative 
patent systems on the cost of health care: the TPPA and HIV treatment in Vietnam, presented at 5th 
Asia‐Pacific Innovation Conference (Nov. 2014), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2536254 
[https://perma.cc/5PDR-EXYF] (Vietnam); Vernaz, supra note 221 (Switzerland). 
253.  See generally Kapczynski, Polymorphs and Prodrugs, supra note 69. 
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molecular entities were linked to patents, but those with listed patents 
were more often associated with a formulation patent (81% of drugs) or a 
method of use patent (83%) than with a chemical compound patent 
(64%).254 Patents with no chemical compound claim expired an average 
of 9 to 11 years later than the five-year data exclusivity term, or 14 to 16 
years after approval.255 They also expired on average 4 to 5 years after the 
chemical compound patent.256 Within this set, the formulation patents 
expired an average of 6.5 years after the compound patent, and method of 
use patents expired an average of 7.4 years later.257 For half of the new 
molecular entities (51%), the innovator also held a patent claiming a 
variant of the initial active ingredient—a polymorph, isomer, prodrug, 
ester, or salt.258 These patents tended to expire 6.3 years later than the 
initial compound patent.259 
Three articles round out this collection. One author considered the 
patents listed in the ORANGE BOOK for the 938 new drug applications 
approved by FDA from 1998 to 2005.260 She found that 305 applications 
listed just one patent, 67% listed more than one patent, and the average 
number of patents listed was 2.97.261 She also found that the number of 
patents listed for a given new drug application increased over time.262 The 
authors of another study counted and classified patents associated with 
ritonavir (marketed as Norvir), lopinavir, and the combination of the two 
(marketed as Kaletra), finding 82 patents and 26 patent applications.263 
The initial active-ingredient patents were due to expire in 2014 (ritonavir) 
and 2016 (lopinavir).264 Other patents covered innovations ranging from 
new formulations to polymorphs, and the last was scheduled to expire in 
2028.265 Finally, a group of authors counted the patents listed in the 
ORANGE BOOK for 49 products that combined a medical device and 
254.  Id. at 6. 
255.  Id. 
256.  Id.  
257.  Id. at 7 (Table 3). 
258.  Id. at 6. 
259.  Id. at 5. 
260.  Ouellette, How Many Patents, supra note 131, at 311–14. 
261.  Id. at 314. 
262.  Id. at 316. 
263.  Amin & Kesselheim, supra note 122. They used the Thomson Innovation database of U.S. 
patent applications and granted patents, rather than the ORANGE BOOK, though they double checked 
their results in the latter. Id. at 2287. For another example of this type of patent counting, see Mike 
Lloyd, Evergreening by whom? A review of secondary patents for omeprazole, 2 PHARM. PAT. 
ANALYST 737 (2013) (counting and describing patents associated omeprazole). 
264.  Amin & Kesselheim, supra note 122, at 2288. 
265.  Id. at 2290. 
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epinephrine, insulin, or a drug for asthma or chronic obstructive 
pulmonary disease.266 They found 235 patents, 129 of which claimed the 
device itself.267 For 26 products, a device patent expired later than the 
active ingredient patent, and for 14 products, device patents were the only 
unexpired patents.268 
Two articles examined both patents and statutory exclusivities. The 
more significant article examined every ORANGE BOOK listing for every 
approved drug listed in the publication between 2005 and 2015.269 The 
author focused on the 3,372 discrete new drug applications in her 
dataset.270 Of these, 1,322 applications (roughly 40%) were linked to a 
patent issued or exclusivity recognized by FDA after the initial 
application approval date.271 Most had more than one post-approval patent 
or exclusivity.272 And 29 applications had more than 18 patents or 
exclusivities added after approval.273 Roughly three-quarters of the best-
selling drugs (meaning those in the top 50 of sales in any of the years 
studied) had a post-approval exclusivity or patent that expired later than 
the patents and exclusivities recorded at the time of initial approval.274 
Another author reviewed all patents and approval-related 
exclusivities associated, by 2011, with applications approved by FDA 
from 2000 to 2010.275 Applications approved at the start of the window 
averaged more patents than applications approved at the end of the 
window: she recorded 4.5 per application approved in 2000 and 2.9 per 
application approved the year before the paper was published.276 She also 
calculated the remaining patent life (the time from approval until expiry 
of latest expiring patent) for the applications, finding that applications 
approved in 2000 averaged 17 years and drugs approved in 2010 averaged 
9.2 years.277 Applications approved at the start of the window also 
averaged more statutory exclusivities (new-chemical-entity exclusivity, 
three-year condition-of-approval exclusivity, seven-year orphan 
 266.  Read F. Beall et al., Is Patent “Evergreening” Restricting Access to Medicine/Device 
Combination Products?, 11 PLOS ONE 2, Feb. 24, 2016. 
267.  Id. at 3. 
268.  Id. at 6. 
269.  See Feldman, May Your Drug Price, supra note 126. 
270.  Id. at 607, 619 Table 1. 
271.  Id. at 619 Table 2. 
272.  Id. at 634. 
273.  Id. at 635 Table 7. 
274.  Id. at 638. 
275.  See Kate Gaudry, Evergreening: A Common Practice to Protect New Drugs, 29 NAT. 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 876 (2011). 
276.  Id. at 877. 
277.  Id. 
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exclusivity, and six-month pediatric exclusivity) than applications 
approved at the end of the window; she recorded 5.6 for applications 
approved in 2000 and 2.0 for applications approved in 2010.278 And 
applications approved at the beginning averaged 6.4 years between 
approval date and expiry of last-expiring exclusivity, compared to 
applications approved at the end (3.6 years).279 
2. Patent Litigation
Two authors have focused on patent litigation associated with patents 
held by innovators, especially patents other than the active ingredient 
patent. First, these authors examined patents listed in the ORANGE BOOK 
for 479 “drugs” that first became eligible for generic challenge between 
2000 and 2008.280 This appears to mean 479 active ingredients rather than 
finished products or marketing applications.281 The number of patents 
listed per “drug” increased over time.282 The “nominal patent term”—the 
period between application approval and expiration of the last-expiring 
patent—increased over time.283 A longer nominal patent term had a 
positive and significant effect on the likelihood of a patent challenge, 
meaning the likelihood that a generic company would file a paragraph IV 
certification stating that its product did not infringe the patent or that the 
patent was invalid.284 Having only non-active-ingredient patents had a 
positive and statistically significant effect on the likelihood of a challenge 
by a generic applicant.285 Sales had a large, positive, and statistically 
significant effect on the likelihood of challenge, meaning that larger sales 
volumes increased the chances of challenge.286 And the number of patents 
listed after approval had a strong, positive, and statistically significant 
effect on the likelihood of a challenge.287 
278.  Id. at 878. 
279.  Id. at 878. 
280.  C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, When Do Generics Challenge Drug Patents?, 9 
J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 613, 626 (2011). 
 281.  See id. at 627 (identifying several “drugs” in the sample, including Abilify (aripiprazole)—
which by the time they ran their study was linked to more than one new drug application, suggesting 
they were counting all “aripiprazole” applications together). There is nothing wrong with this 
approach, to be sure; it is simply important to be clear what was counted. 
282.  Id. at 619. 
283.  Id. at 622. 
284.  Id. at 633. 
285.  Id. 
286.  Id. at 632. 
287.  Id. at 633. 
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In their second study, the authors examined the patents listed in the 
ORANGE BOOK for the 119 new molecular entities first subjected to 
competition from a therapeutically equivalent generic product between 
2001 and 2010.288 Each new molecular entity (first dosage form) had 2.7 
patents on average, yielding an average nominal patent term of 15.9 
years.289 The average “effective market life”—meaning the time from 
FDA approval until first approval of a therapeutically equivalent generic 
product—was, however, 12.2 years.290 This effective market life ends 
well before the last-expiring patent and has not meaningfully increased 
over time.291 Two-thirds (78) received a patent challenge, fewer than half 
of which targeted an active ingredient patent.292 Nominal patent term 
increased sharply with sales, as did the likelihood of a patent challenge 
within five years of launch.293 Conditional on sales, the likelihood of 
challenge was also strongly related to nominal patent term.294 New 
molecular entities with more non-active-ingredient patents were also more 
likely to draw challenges.295 Finally, there was a strong, negative, and 
statistically significant relationship between patent challenges and time to 
generic entry, meaning that drugs facing patent challenges experience 
earlier generic entry.296 
These articles contribute to a broader literature examining drug 
patent litigation, effective patent life, and actual exclusivity (time to 
generic market entry) with a new active ingredient. A full review of this 
literature, much of which does not use the term “evergreening,” is beyond 
the scope of this Article.297 One paper published in 2017 adds two 
important nuances, however.298 The authors assembled a dataset of new 
drugs approved from 1994 to 2006 and found that litigation outcomes 
 288.  See C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, Evergreening, Patent Challenges, and 
Effective Market Life in Pharmaceuticals, 31 J. HEALTH ECON. 327 (2012). They restricted their 
attention to the dosage form designated by FDA as the new molecular entity, meaning the first 
approved finished product (or products, if FDA approved multiple strengths at the same time). Id. at 
329. 
289.  Id. at 330. 
290.  Id. 
291.  Id. at 329 (defining effective market life); id. at 330 (noting average effective market life 
is four years shorter than average nominal patent term); id. at 336 (noting that average effective market 
life is “essentially stable over time”). 
292.  Id. at 330. 
293.  Id. at 330–31. 
294.  Id. at 334. 
295.  Id. 
296.  Id. at 333. 
297.  See Henry Grabowski, et al., Pharmaceutical Patent Challenges, 3 AM. J. HEALTH ECON. 
33, 37–38 (2017) (providing a brief literature review). 
298.  Id. 
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varied among the different types of non-active-ingredient patents. Generic 
companies prevail in 71% of the court decisions relating to formulation-
only patents, but only 33% of the decisions relating to method-of-use 
patents.299 
3. Healthcare Expenditures
A recent article calculated healthcare expenditures associated with 
certain new dosage forms listed in the ORANGE BOOK between 1982 and 
2018.300 The author focused on “reformulations,” which he defined to 
mean extended release, delayed release, or oral dissolving products 
containing the same active ingredient as a previously approved product, 
marketed by the same company or under the same proprietary name.301 
Out of 2,405 active ingredients in the ORANGE BOOK, he identified 73 
associated with reformulation.302 The new dosage forms were listed an 
average of 7.9 years after initial approval of the active ingredient.303 The 
author calculated “healthcare expenditures” associated with reformulation 
by assuming that every sale of the innovator’s new dosage form 
represented a “foregone” sale for the generic company.304 Using the price 
differential between the innovator’s new dosage form and generic copies 
of the older dosage form, he calculated that these “evergreened” 
reformulations “increased Medicaid expenditures” by $9.35 billion from 
2008 to 2016.305 
IV. THE MEANING OF THE METAPHOR
The examples and empirical work tell us five things. First, 
innovators do a lot of incremental innovation—they develop new 
medicines that relate to and build on their initial discovery of a 
biologically useful molecule.306 They patent the innovations they can, and 
299.  Id. at 53. 
300.  See generally Dickson, supra note 228. 
301.  Id. at 781. 
302.  Id. at 783. This includes three that did not satisfy his definition but that he added manually 
because the reformulations “captured substantial market share for the group more than 2 years after 
the first brand product was released.” Id. at 782. 
303.  Dickson, supra note 228, at 783. 
 304.  Id. at 782–83 (“For example, if there was 90% generic uptake of initial formulation 
prescriptions and no generic evergreened reformulations were approved, we assumed that 90% of the 
evergreened reformulation prescriptions would have been generic had a generic been available.”). 
305.  Id. at 784. 
306.  This is not surprising, nor is it unique to the pharmaceutical industry. See, e.g., Albert 
Wertheimer et al., Too Many Drugs? The Clinical and Economic Value of Incremental Innovations, 
in 14 INVESTING IN HEALTH: THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF HEALTH CARE INNOVATION 
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they introduce new products, which usually also benefit from statutory 
exclusivity. Second, the associated patents often expire later than the 
initial active ingredient patent, and the associated exclusivity expire, 
which is also later than the data exclusivity protecting the new chemical 
entity. Third, generic companies file ANDAs as early as they can, arguing 
that the patents are invalid or, if applicable, not infringed. They tend to 
lose these arguments when the active ingredient patent is at issue, but they 
tend to win (one argument or the other) if a formulation patent is at issue. 
Fourth, generic challenges—claims that listed patents are invalid or not 
infringed—are linked to earlier market entry. Finally, the innovator’s 
newer products, protected by patents and exclusivity, are more expensive 
than generic copies of the innovator’s first-approved products. 
The challenge comes in leaping from these unremarkable findings to 
the term “evergreening,” whether this means the metaphor or the 
definitions in the literature. Both require that something be extended, and 
the challenge lies in identifying a thing extended. Writers are inconsistent 
about what has been extended and often vague about how the supposed 
“extension” occurs, given the landscape described in Part II.307 The 
empirical scholarship does not help; the various counting exercises offer 
robust evidence of post-approval innovations, new product introductions, 
and patents and exclusivity, but locating an extension of a thing is 
challenging.308 
This Part considers the definitions, examples, and empirical studies 
described in Part III within the context described in Part II to arrive at a 
proposal about what, exactly, has been extended in the scenarios of 
concern. But this Article was motivated in part by concern that use of the 
metaphor and imprecision in the scholarship may be leading audiences to 
error. So, it begins with a discussion of what has not been extended. As 
77, 78 (I. Farquhar et al. eds., 2001) (“The process of repeated incremental improvement is the 
predominant mechanism of innovation and product development within most manufacturing and 
high-technology industries.”). 
307.  See supra Part III.A. 
 308.  The author of the primary patent and exclusivity counting paper, for instance, writes that 
with these patents and exclusivity an innovator extends its “protection cliff.” Feldman, May Your 
Drug Price, supra note 126, at 597. But the paper does not examine the timing or effect of FDA 
approval of any abbreviated applications that may have cited the innovator’s active ingredient. 
Others may assume that more has been shown empirically. E.g., Yaniv Heled et al., Why Healthcare 
Companies Should Be(Come) Benefit Corporations, 60 B.C. L. REV. 73, 102 (2019) (asserting that 
there is “significant controversy surrounding the purpose and legitimacy of these practices” but that 
“there is little dispute that they delay and sometimes even prevent competition in drug markets,” citing 
articles that do not provide empirical support for the latter claim); Ho, New World Order, supra note 
145, at 1512 (“[E]vergreening is recognized as an issue worldwide due to its negative impact in 
delaying introduction of lower-cost generic drugs . . . .”). 
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explained below, no patent has been extended. No statutory exclusivity 
has been extended. No generic company has been blocked from obtaining 
approval of its own product containing the same active ingredient through 
an abbreviated application that relies on the innovator’s research, nor has 
any been blocked from enjoying sales of such a product (even sales 
exceeding those enjoyed by the innovator). For that matter, no generic 
company has been prevented from conducting its own clinical testing to 
secure approval for its own product. 
A. No Extension of Patent or Statutory Exclusivity 
To begin with, these situations never involve extension of patents. 
This would be legally impossible. In the United States, a patent expires 
20 years after its application date.309 There are only two ways a patent’s 
expiration date can shift later in time. First, when it issues a patent, the 
PTO adjusts the expiry date later to compensate for routine delays at the 
PTO.310 Second, if the marketing application proposed a new active 
ingredient and the company asked the PTO for a patent term extension 
within 60 days of FDA approval, then the PTO will use a statutory formula 
to extend one patent claiming the product to compensate partially for the 
lapse of patent life during premarket testing and regulatory review.311 
There is no other mechanism by which a drug patent might be extended.312 
Legal scholars rarely suggest the impossible—extension of individual 
patents—though some do.313 But much of the scholarship uses loose 
 309.  35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2018). If the patent relates to an earlier-filed patent, it lasts for 20 
years from the earlier patent application date. Id. 
310.  Id. § 154(b). 
 311.  Id. § 156. See generally Erika Lietzan and Kristina Acri, Distorted Drug Patents, 95 
WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (discussing how the restoration does not compensate fully for the 
time lost in trials). 
312.  To be sure, a company could seek a legislative fix, meaning a private bill extending its 
patent. But companies rarely seek them, and Congress almost never enacts them. See Erika Lietzan, 
The History and Political Economy of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments, 54 SETON HALL L. REV. 53, 
107–11 (2018) (discussing four exceptions in the early 1980s). 
 313.  In some cases, this wording—though legally impossible—is meant to attract attention 
rather than to assert a factual claim. E.g., Amin & Kesselheim, supra note 122 (referring to “how 
patents on two HIV drugs could be extended for decades” in their title). In others, it may be a 
misstatement of the law. E.g., Miriam Bitton, Examining the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, 
17 J. INTERNET L. 25, 35 (2014) (defining evergreening as “drug companies making small changes to 
their drug and thus ‘blocking’ the patent’s expiration for another 20 years”); Chander & Sunder, supra 
note 159, at 340 n.33 (“Lower patentability standards allow for more patents and longer patents—
hence the name ‘evergreen’ patent. Innovators can go for low hanging fruit—extensions on existing 
patents—rather than focus on breakthrough inventions with proven therapeutic benefits.”). 
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language about extending the patent “term” or patent “life” of a drug.314 
And other writers do suggest the impossible.315 
The explanation might be something like this: We mean that another 
patent effectively precludes approval (or launch, or market penetration) 
of a generic copy of the innovator’s first product, so it is “as if” the 
innovator had extended the active ingredient patent. We are simply using 
words economically.316 The concern is that non-specialist audiences—
journalists, lay readers, and policymakers—may take the language 
literally. And they do.317 
 314.  See supra Part III.A.2. See also McCarthy, Pharma Barons, supra note 153, at 53 (“an 
extended 20-year patent period for what amounts to an identical drug product produced by the same 
company”); William G. Adams, Note, Combating the Anti-Trade Movement: Evaluating the Trans-
Pacific Partnership’s Place in International Patent Law, 24 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 75, 80 (2016) 
(“Evergreening is a popular practice for pharmaceutical companies, which extend the effective life of 
their patent, often well beyond the statutory period of twenty years, to prevent cheaper generic drugs 
from entering the market.”); Jeffrey Coleman, Note, “Undetected, Unsuspected, and Unknown”: 
Should We Anticipate Problems for Scientific Innovation Following Schering Corp. v. Geneva 
Pharmaceuticals?, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 165, 169 n.29 (2013) (defining “evergreening” as “a strategy 
by which a patentee obtains, or attempts to obtain, multiple patents that cover different aspects of the 
same invention in an effort to extend the term of the patent and the exclusivity privileges that come 
with it”). 
 315.  E.g., Katrina Grace Geddes, Sovereign Immunity for Rent: How the Commodification of 
Tribal Sovereign Immunity Reflects the Failures of the U.S. Patent System, 29 FORDHAM INTELL. 
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 767, 780 (2019) (stating that pharmaceutical patentees are “notorious for 
their attempts to extend the duration of their patents through evergreening”); Sierra Dean, Case Note, 
India’s Controversial New Patent Regime: The End of Affordable Generics?, 40 INT’L L. 725, 731 
(2006) (“Evergreening refers to renewals of expired patents by pharmaceutical companies by citing a 
new use for the same drug, thereby extending the patent monopoly.”); Hannah Elizabeth 
Jarrells, Note, History, TRIPS, and Common Sense: Curbing the Counterfeit Drug Market in Sub-
Saharan Africa, 43 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 557, 568 (2015) (stating that “slightly changing a drug’s 
chemical composition by combining formulas or making time-release versions . . . extends the life of 
the original patent”). 
 316.  Several scholars write about the innovator effectively or nominally extending its active 
ingredient patent. E.g., Daniel R. Cahoy, Patent Fences and Constitutional Fence Posts: Property 
Barriers to Pharmaceutical Importation, 15 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 623, 632 
(2005) (“Later-filed patents on ancillary aspects of a product may have the effect of nominally 
extending core patents, assuming they continue to prevent competitors from making the product.”). 
One explains that the term “evergreening” is used because “the patent term appears ‘evergreen’ even 
if the commercial exclusivity is technically achieved through different patents.” Ho, Should All 
Drugs, supra note 216, at 297. 
 317.  E.g., Federal Trade Commission Oversight, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, 
Sci., & Transp., 114th Cong. (Sept. 27, 2016) (statement of Sen. Klobuchar) (“And the idea here is 
that a company will take a drug and maybe go from a tablet to a capsule or maybe to a 24-release 
capsule, and then that extends their patent protections. That’s why they call it ‘evergreening.’ Then 
another competitor or a generic can’t come in the market. So, you can just keep extending and 
extending, and then we have no competition at all.”); Insulin Access and Affordability: Hearing 
Before the S, Spec. Comm. on Aging, 115th Cong. (May 8, 2018) (statement of Sen. Collins) (“I have 
previously expressed my concern with the practice called evergreening. This means when 
pharmaceutical companies obtain patents based on small innovations to extend the exclusivity of a 
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But even the more nuanced claim is wrong. It is never “as if” the 
innovator had extended the active ingredient patent. Whether an innovator 
secures a patent on a new strength, dosage form, route of administration, 
formulation, or combination—and markets a new product reflecting that 
innovation—does not affect the term of the initial patent claiming the 
active ingredient.318 Once that patent expires, a generic company can use 
the ingredient in its own product, and it may even rely on the research in 
the innovator’s initial marketing application. And only the active 
ingredient has to be the same for a generic drug. A generic company may 
be able to design around intellectual property claiming other aspects (such 
as strength and route of administration) of the innovator’s drug and still 
file an ANDA.319 If it cannot file an ANDA, it can always file a 505(b)(2) 
application.320 As one scholar points out, the suggestion that the innovator 
has secured an “extension” of the first patent in these situations “involves 
a bit of analytical sleight of hand.”321 Claiming that the innovator might 
as well have done so is similarly disingenuous. 
So too with statutory exclusivity. The drug statute provides five years 
of new-chemical-entity data exclusivity and three years of exclusivity for 
new products and new conditions of approval.322 It also provides seven 
years of market exclusivity for orphan drugs and orphan indications.323 
These exclusivities are governed by different provisions, triggered in 
different situations, and operate in different ways. And none is extended 
in the scenarios of concern. The contrasting mechanism of pediatric 
product after its initial patent expires. For insulin, a careful look is warranted to determine if minor 
modifications were used to just extend the patent protection and discourage competitors.”). 
 318.  Cf. Daniel R. Cahoy & Leland Glenna, Private Ordering and Public Energy Innovation 
Policy, 36 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 415, 429 (2009) (“[O]ne cannot simply extend the power of a broad 
patent by filing subsequent, related patents based on the original disclosure because the original 
claimed invention will be available to competitors once the initial right expires.”); Holman, In 
Defense of Secondary Pharmaceutical Patents, supra note 19, at 795 (“[N]ew patents might preclude 
some newly invented uses, [but] they generally do not stop a generic company from selling a 
competing version of the original drug for the originally approved indications.”); see also 
Price, Regulating Secrecy, supra note 176, at 1777 n.43 (noting that patents have a “clearly defined 
term of twenty years from the date of the application” and that despite the potential for adjustment 
and restoration for the PTO’s delay and premarket testing, respectively, they have a “distinct end,” 
which means that “evergreening can only do so much, and each individual patent remains a right with 
a defined duration”); Israel Agranat & Silvya R. Wainschtein, The Strategy of Enantiomer Patents of 
Drugs, 15 DRUG DISCOV. TODAY 163, 168 (2010) (“inventing the single-enantiomer drug as a 
successor to the racemic drug does not ‘extend,’ ‘repatent’ or ‘evergreen’ the basic patent”). 
319.  See supra Parts I.A and I.B.3. And its formulation need not be the same. See supra Part 
II.A.
320.  See supra Parts I.A and I.B.3.  
321.  Darrow, Debunking, supra note 19, at 7 (typographical error corrected). 
322.  See supra Part II.B.1. 
323.  See supra Part II.B.4. 
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exclusivity illustrates the point.324 Six-month pediatric exclusivity 
extends all applicable exclusivity periods in the drug statute. Thus, 
abbreviated applications may not be submitted until five and a half years 
after approval of a new chemical entity, and this period is shortened to 
four and a half years if the generic company challenges a patent.325 
Exclusivity for new conditions of approval and new products that lack 
new chemical entities lasts for three and a half years, and orphan 
exclusivity lasts for seven and a half years.326 If a generic company 
submits a paragraph III certification agreeing not to challenge a particular 
patent, FDA approval of its application cannot take effect until patent 
expiry plus six months.327 This is what it means to “extend” exclusivity.328 
Whatever else may be going on in the “evergreening” situations described 
by scholars, it is never the case that the duration of one of these fixed 
terms has been lengthened. 
B. No Extension of “Exclusivity” in the Descriptive Sense 
Nor has the innovator preserved its position as the only company 
selling products containing the active ingredient. The innovator’s actions 
have not blocked approval of abbreviated applications or the promotion 
and sale of the resulting products. The scholarship could be clearer on this 
point. Instead, an ambiguity inherent in FDA law—which generally goes 
unremarked—has led to confusing, and perhaps even sometimes 
confused, claims in the literature, which may mislead general audiences. 
At FDA, the term “drug” has more than one meaning.329 The statute 
defines “drug” to mean (among other things) any article “intended for 
use” in the treatment of disease, any article (other than food) “intended to 
affect the structure or function of the body,” and any “component” of such 
an article.330 Depending on the statutory provision or regulation at issue, 
FDA may take the term to mean only a finished drug product, only an 
active ingredient, or both. For example, for years FDA interpreted the 
324.  See supra Part II.B.4. 
325.  21 U.S.C. §§ 355a(b)(1)(A)(i)(I), (c)(1)(A)(i)(I) (2018). 
326.  Id. §§ 355a(b)(1)(A)(i)(II), (b)(1)(A)(ii), (c)(1)(A)(i)(II), (c)(1)(A)(ii). 
327.  Id. §§ 355a(b)(1)(B)(i), (c)(1)(B)(i). 
328.  A few scholars describe earning pediatric exclusivity as an act of “evergreening.” E.g., El-
Said, supra note 220, at 394 (referring to pediatric exclusivity for atorvastatin, marketing as Lipitor); 
see also Gervais, The Patent Option, supra note 172, at 395 n.151 (footnote implying that pediatric 
exclusivity is a type of evergreening); Halabi, The Drug Repurposing Ecosystem, supra note 181, at 
50–51(stating that pediatric exclusivity for glucophage represented evergreening). 
 329.  See also Feldman, May Your Drug Price, supra note 126, at 607–09 (grappling with some 
of this ambiguity). 
330.  21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1) (2018). 
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term “drug” in the statutory provision governing five-year new-chemical-
entity exclusivity to mean finished drug product. But in 2014, it switched 
to construing the term to mean “drug substance or active ingredient.”331 
The statute requires FDA to publish a list of every approved “drug,”332 
and FDA lists every approved product. The pediatric exclusivity provision 
refers to studying use of a “new drug” and extending by six months 
various statutory exclusivities related to the “drug,” and FDA interprets 
the provision to permit extension of exclusivity applicable to the drug 
products containing the underlying active moiety.333 In one part of its 
regulation governing the contents of a new drug application, FDA uses 
“drug” to mean active ingredient, reserving “drug product” for the 
finished product.334 In another part of the same regulation, FDA 
distinguishes between “drug substance” and “drug product.”335 
The distinction between active-ingredient-drug and finished-
product-drug is important because active ingredients and finished 
products occupy different places in the legal framework. An example will 
show this. Consider the atypical antipsychotic Zyprexa (olanzapine). 
Zyprexa (olanzapine) is sold in tablets for oral administration; there are 
six strengths ranging from 2.5 mg to 20 mg. FDA considers each strength 
a separate drug product; FDA approved one application (#20592), but it 
considers the strengths as products 001 through 006 associated with that 
application.336 Lilly also sells a 10 mg vial of olanzapine for intramuscular 
injection. FDA generally requires a separate application for a new route 
of administration.337 And Lilly filed a separate application (#21253) for 
this product. The company also developed an orally disintegrating tablet 
for oral administration. FDA considers this a different dosage form,338 
 331.  See FDA, NEW CHEMICAL ENTITY EXCLUSIVITY DETERMINATIONS FOR CERTAIN FIXED-
COMBINATION DRUG PRODUCTS: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY 2 (Oct. 2014) (“NCE GUIDANCE”) 
(referring to 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii)). FDA changed its approach so that a fixed dose combination 
with one new chemical entity would receive five years, instead of three years, of exclusivity, noting 
that these combinations were “becoming increasingly important from patient and public health 
perspectives” and that combination therapy was “emerging as the standard of care” in several disease 
settings. Id. 
332.  21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(7) (2018). 
333.  See supra Part II.B.4. 
334.  E.g., 21 C.F.R. § 314.50(c)(2)(ii) (2020) (requiring that each new drug application include 
a summary with a statement “identifying the pharmacologic class of the drug and a discussion of the 
scientific rationale for the drug, its intended use, and the potential clinical benefits of the drug 
product”). 
 335.  E.g., 21 C.F.R. § 314.50(d)(1) (2020) (requiring that each new drug application describe 
“the composition, manufacture, and specifications of the drug substance and the drug product”). 
336.  ORANGE BOOK, supra note 43, at 3-326. 
337.  FDA, SEPARATE APPLICATIONS GUIDANCE, supra note 48. 
338.  ORANGE BOOK, supra note 43, at Appendix C. 
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which usually needs a separate application.339 There are four strengths—
four products, 001 through 004—on this marketing application 
(#21086).340 Lilly calls this product Zyprexa Zydis.341 Finally, the 
company developed an extended release formulation containing 
olanzapine pamoate monohydrate, also for intramuscular injection.342 An 
innovator must file a separate application for a product containing a new 
active ingredient, even if the underlying active moiety is the same.343 Lilly 
submitted a separate marketing application (#22173) and calls this 
product Zyprexa Relprevv. 
One active moiety—olanzapine—is offered for sale in 14 discrete 
drug products covered by 4 new drug applications associated with 3 brand 
names.344 Because of the ambiguity in the term “drug,” one could 
correctly say that there are 14 drugs (discrete products), 2 drugs (two 
active ingredients), and perhaps even 1 drug (one active moiety). Writers 
and readers insufficiently attuned to the nuances of the regulatory 
framework might also think—incorrectly—that because there are four 
marketing applications, there are four drugs. Others might focus on the 
brand name (which is never a “drug” at FDA) and think this story involves 
either one drug or three drugs. Understanding that there are 14 discrete 
drug products is important because each product is legally distinct. When 
a generic company cites a “reference listed drug” in its generic 
application, it cites one product—meaning 1 of the 14, not “Zyprexa” or 
olanzapine writ large.345 The generic company’s burden—the requirement 
to show sameness and bioequivalence and, critically, the obligation to 
address patents—is tied to the specific one product, alone.346 
339.  FDA, SEPARATE APPLICATIONS GUIDANCE, supra note 48. 
340.  ORANGE BOOK, supra note 43, at 3-327. 
341.  FDA might tell an innovator that it could not use the same brand name for a different but 
related product, if FDA was concerned about prescriber or patent confusion. And an innovator might 
choose a new brand name for business reasons. 
 342.  The pamoate salt of the molecule slowly dissociates into olanzapine and pamoic acid, 
which means the olanzapine releases slowly into the blood stream over several weeks. J.P. 
Lindenmayer, Long-acting injectable antipsychotics: focus on olanzapine pamoate, 6 
NEUROPSYCHIATRIC DISEASE & TREATMENT 261, 262 (2010). 
 343.  From FDA’s perspective, a change in active ingredient inherently raises issues of safety 
and effectiveness that must be examined in clinical investigations. 
 344.  Some articles imply that the proliferation of applications and products containing a single 
active ingredient reflects gamesmanship on the part of innovators, but FDA’s policies and 
preferences—often dictated by review considerations—typically control in these situations. 
345.  See supra Part II.A. 
 346.  See supra Part II.A. If a generic company files an application under § 505(b)(2), it may 
reference multiple listed drugs. E.g., Letter from Steven K. Galson, Acting Dir. of Ctr. for Drug 
Evaluation & Research, to Donald O. Beers & William F. Cavanaugh, Jr., Re: Docket No. 2004P-
0386/CP1 & RC1 (Nov. 30, 2004) at 7–8 (referring to a 505(b)(2) applicant relying on listed “drug 
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It would therefore be a mistake for policymakers to focus on the 
number of “patents” associated with a “drug.” A generic company does 
not copy a “drug” in the broad sense of the term. It copies a particular 
finished product—a “drug” in the narrow sense of the term. Lilly no 
longer holds an unexpired patent on the active ingredient, olanzapine. 
Suppose it developed a new Zyprexa product containing olanzapine, and 
suppose it listed five patents for that product. One could correctly assert 
that Lilly had secured approval of a new olanzapine product with patents 
expiring long after its active-ingredient patent expired. Someone counting 
patents would say that Zyprexa has five later-issued patents (on top of 
whatever earlier issued patents it might have had). Yet, there are approved 
generic olanzapine drugs in the market. Someone seeking to describe 
accurately a generic company’s freedom to operate would focus on 
discrete drug products that can serve as reference listed drugs and on the 
number, scope, and breadth of the patent claims held by the innovator for 
those products. This would tell us more about the market impact of an 
innovator’s innovation and patenting practices than the number of patents 
associated with a particular brand name or the number of patents 
associated with the many finished products containing a particular active 
ingredient. 
The same thing is true when one counts statutory exclusivity 
terms.347 Again, a three-year exclusivity period associated with a new 
condition of approval delays approval only of abbreviated applications 
proposing products with the same active moiety for the same condition of 
or drugs”). In this case, it would need to address the patents listed for each that it has chosen to cite. 
Id. at 8, 8 n.8. But regardless of the type of abbreviated application it files, a generic applicant is not 
required to address patents listed only for other products marketed by the innovator, including newer 
products containing the same active ingredient. See generally id. (rejecting petition that had asked 
FDA to require Reliant to certify to all patents on all later-approved products that were supported by 
any of the same clinical studies). 
 347.  Although definitions of “evergreening” focus more on patents than statutory exclusivity, 
some legal scholars do mention statutory exclusivity. E.g., Baker, Ending Drug Registration 
Apartheid, supra note 128, at 306 (describing “evergreening of data-exclusivity” by which “a product 
can obtain overlapping and successive periods of three-year exclusivity if the innovator acts 
strategically in seeking new indications or in introducing product variations”); Feldman, May Your 
Drug Price, supra note 126, at 596 (defining “evergreening” as “artificially extending the life of a 
patent or other exclusivity by obtaining additional protections to extend the monopoly period”); 
Gervais, The Patent Option, supra note 172, at 395 n.151; Halabi, The Drug Repurposing Ecosystem, 
supra note 181, at 43 (arguing that “evergreening strategies” are “adopted . . . in the various market 
exclusivity regimes administered by FDA”); see also Emily K. White, Killing U.S. Slowly: Curing 
the Epidemic Rise of Cancer Drug Prices, 72 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 189, 204 (2017) (“Although the 
practice of extending market protection through statutory exclusivities is not technically considered 
evergreening . . . , this practice also delays generic market entry, contributing to increased drug 
costs.”). And some empirical literature counts statutory exclusivity. See supra Part III.C.1. 
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approval.348 Thus, if an innovator establishes its product is safe and 
effective for treatment of a new disease, FDA will not approve any 
applications for the same active moiety for treatment of that disease for 
three years.349 If the innovator establishes that its product is safe and 
effective for treatment of that disease through a novel route of 
administration, its three-year exclusivity will block only products 
containing that active moiety for that use through that route of 
administration.350 Orphan exclusivity operates similarly.351 These later-
arising exclusivities are, in other words, thin—leaving generic companies 
substantial freedom to operate.352 That a particular “drug” is linked to 
many exclusivities earned after approval tells us that the innovator has a 
vigorous research and development program but precious little about the 
prospects for (and timing of) approval of abbreviated applications 
proposing products with the same active ingredient.353 
For all of these reasons, it is a challenge to locate the “extension” 
alleged in the definitions and supposedly illustrated by the examples in 
the literature. FDA’s approval of a new dosage form does not prevent a 
generic company from copying the innovator’s old dosage form. To be 
sure, the new dosage form might be protected by a new patent. But a 
patent claiming only the new dosage form would not be listed in the 
ORANGE Book with the original marketing application, and generic 
companies referencing that application would not need to address it. And 
while the new dosage form might earn the innovator three years of 
statutory exclusivity, preventing approval of any other application for that 
active moiety in that dosage form for three years, this exclusivity would 
not block approval of an abbreviated application proposing a product 
containing the active ingredient in the original dosage form. 
348.  See supra Part II.B.2. 
349.  See supra Part II.B.2. 
350.  See supra Part II.B.2. 
351.  See supra Part II.B.4. 
352.  Failing to make this point clearly may confuse readers. E.g., Baker, Ending Drug 
Registration Apartheid, supra note 128, at 306 (complaining of “overlapping and successive periods 
of three-year exclusivity” and suggesting that a second applicant cannot get approval until the final 
three-year term has ended). 
 353.  The innovator’s first product could have patents claiming aspects other than its active 
ingredient, and these could expire later than the active ingredient patent. In these cases, the generic 
company will need to design around these patents, challenge them as invalid, or seek licenses, which 
means it will face higher entry costs than if the innovator had only one patent. Most allegations of 
“evergreening” relate to the introduction of newer products with their own intellectual property 
protection, though, rather than to the issuance of more than one patent on the innovator’s originally 
marketed product as introduced. See supra Part III.B.1. 
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So too, if the innovator introduces a new active ingredient. The new 
product might be claimed in a new patent, and it might receive three years 
of statutory exclusivity (or even five years if the active ingredient is a new 
chemical entity). But the patent and exclusivity will not affect a generic 
company seeking to copy the innovator’s original product.354 Nor would 
the innovator’s combination of the active ingredient with another, in a new 
fixed dose combination product. The combination product might receive 
three years of statutory exclusivity (or five years, if the second, new active 
ingredient is a new chemical entity), but the exclusivity would not prevent 
FDA from approving a generic copy of the innovator’s original single-
ingredient product.355 And if the patents on the underlying active 
ingredients have expired, a generic company could also market—and 
doctors prescribe and payers cover—the two constituents as stand-alone 
drugs.356 
Nor does approval of the innovator’s drug for a new use block 
approval of abbreviated applications or sales of the resulting products. 
Even if there is only one approved innovative product to reference, a 
generic company may omit the use from its labeling, and FDA will usually 
approve its drug anyway.357 The generic company will even enjoy sales 
for the use that is omitted from its labeling.358 This illustrates how 
narrowly we should interpret the patent and exclusivity counting 
exercises. In the 35 years since enactment of the generic drug statute, FDA 
has awarded nearly 800 three-year exclusivity terms for the development 
and approval of a new “indication” for an already approved product.359 In 
each case, although this exclusivity prohibited generic companies from 
adding the indication to their labeling, it did not block approval of their 
generic drugs, and those drugs were likely to be prescribed and dispensed 
for that use. While one article reports that “almost 40% of all drugs 
available on the market created additional market barriers by having 
patents or exclusivities added onto them,”360 hundreds of three-year 
 354.  Cf. Andrew Q. Leba, Comment, Lowering the “Efficacy” Threshold for Section 3(d) of the 
Indian Patents (Amendment) Act 2005:A Case for a Broader Scope, 28 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 649, 
682–83 (2014) (“[O]meprazole works sufficiently and has been available as a generic drug to U.S. 
patients for almost ten years . . . . Patients do not have to take Nexium to treat their afflictions.”). 
 355.  In addition, at least in theory, a generic applicant could submit an ANDA citing the fixed 
dose combination product and changing one of the two active ingredients. 
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(ii)(III) (2018). 
356.  See supra Part II.C. 
357.  See supra Part II.A. 
358.  A pharmacy will usually dispense a therapeutically equivalent generic drug for a patented 
use that has been carved out of its labeling. Lietzan, Paper Promises, supra note 92, at 183–91. 
359.  ORANGE BOOK, supra note 43, at ADB34. 
360.  Feldman, May Your Drug Price, supra note 126, at 597. 
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exclusivity awards for new indications counted in that article did not serve 
as market barriers to generic companies. By expanding the uses for which 
those generic drugs were dispensed, as a practical matter, some might 
even have increased the sales that generic companies received. 
Some articles acknowledge that generic companies may introduce 
copies of the innovator’s first product but still apply the “evergreening” 
metaphor.361 It may help to consider the market in these situations. The 
innovator’s newer product creates a new choice for doctors and payers. If 
a doctor selects this product, pharmacists will dispense it rather than 
generic copies of the innovator’s older product.362 Doctors might shift 
their prescribing to this newer product for several reasons, including 
persuasive advertising and promotion—meaning they come to believe 
(based on advertising that, per FDA rules, must be truthful and not 
misleading) that there are benefits to the newer product.363 They might 
shift for other reasons, including actual experience treating patients with 
the two options. But generic companies may advertise and promote their 
products to doctors and patients, and on the basis of this advertising (or 
for other reasons, such as experience with the drug) a doctor might not 
select the innovator’s newer product.364 A doctor might specify the 
innovator’s older product (which would lead to automatic substitution, 
even if the innovator no longer marketed the product) or even the generic 
drug itself. In many cases, the payer’s decision will control, and generic 
companies promote to payers.365 If a payer perceives the innovator’s new 
product as less cost effective than available generic drugs containing the 
361.  These articles equate “evergreening” with “product hopping.” See supra Part III.A.1. 
362.  See supra Part II.C. 
363.  For example, numerous articles cite the introduction of Lexapro (escitalopram) as an 
instance of evergreening. See authorities cited supra note 224. But several studies have found Lexapro 
(escitalopram) more effective than Celexa (citalopram) in treatment of severe depression, and it stands 
to reason that some doctors might choose to prescribe Lexapro instead. E.g., Valery Yevtushenko et 
al., Efficacy and tolerability of escitalopram versus citalopram in major depressive disorder: A 6-
week, multicenter, prospective, randomized, double-blind, active-controlled study in adult patients, 
29 CLINICAL THERAPEUTICS 2319 (2007) (concluding from a prospective, randomized, double-blind, 
active-controlled study of 322 adults with major depressive disorder that escitalopram 10 mg was 
more effective than citalopram 10 and 20 mg at six weeks); J.M. Azorin et al., Traitement des épisodes 
dépressifs sévères: escitalopram est plus efficace que citalopram, 30 L’ENCEPHALE 158 (2004) 
(describing meta-analysis of three clinical trials involved 506 severely depressed patients that 
escitalopram was more effective than citalopram in treatment of severe depression). 
 364.  See supra Part II.C; see also Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Ltd., Civ. No. 12-
3824, 2015 WL 1736957 at *13 (E.D. Penn. Apr. 16, 2015) (“Spending some of its revenue on 
advertising would have lessened Mylan’s now-increased profits. Mylan chose not to do so, relying 
instead on the ‘promotion’ provided by state automatic substitution laws. Mylan is thus a ‘victim’ of 
its own business strategy, not Defendants’ ‘predatory’ conduct.”). 
365.  See supra Part II.C. 
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same active ingredient, it might decline to cover the product. In brief: 
when an innovator introduces a new product into the market, generic 
companies will be able to introduce copies of the innovator’s first product, 
and they may or may not enjoy sales, depending on the choices they make, 
and the choices made by others in the market. And yet, scholars still apply 
the “evergreening” metaphor. To be clear, the fact that generic companies 
may introduce their own copies of the innovator’s initial product is not 
meant as a claim that “there is no such thing as evergreening.” The point 
of this Article is to figure out what the term really means given these facts. 
C. An “Extension” Therefore . . . of What? 
The literature contains more than 100 definitions of “evergreening” 
and several dozen examples of what the authors view as “evergreening.” 
The metaphor directs our attention to something enduring, and the 
definitions center on extension. But no patent has been extended, and no 
statutory exclusivity has been extended. In these scenarios, the 
innovator’s position as the lone source of products containing the active 
ingredient has ended. No barriers prevent generic companies from 
promoting their competing product to doctors, payers, and patients. No 
barriers prevent payers from requiring that their insured patients use the 
generic company’s drug. What, then, has been extended? 
An example will tease out the answer. Suppose that at any given 
time, 1,000 patients suffer from Disease X. Consider a simple world in 
which the innovator is the only game in town; there are no other treatments 
available for the disease. 
First Brand Product. Suppose that in 2010, Innovator introduces Product 
A (containing active ingredient α) for treatment of Disease X. Suppose 
that its patent on α expires in 2020. 
Starting in 2010, all 1,000 patients use Product A. 
Second Brand Product. Suppose that in 2018, Innovator introduces 
Product B for Disease X. Put aside for the moment questions about what 
this product entails; imagine only that it is a discrete drug product. 
Suppose a patent covering this product expires in 2030. 
Beginning in 2018, some patients with Disease X use Product A, and 
some use Product B. Innovator enjoys all the sales. 
Generic Products. In 2020, the patent on α expires, and suppose that two 
generic companies enter the market. They sell Generic A1 and Generic 
A2, which are much cheaper than Product A. Assume that FDA 
designates these generic products as therapeutically equivalent to 
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Product A. Thus if a doctor prescribes Product A, the pharmacist will 
dispense Generic A1 or Generic A2. 
To conclude the example, suppose that beginning in 2020, after 
expiry of the patent on active ingredient α, three-quarters of the patients 
with Disease X (750 patients) purchase Product B from Innovator at prices 
that reflect its patent-based exclusivity, while one-quarter (250 patients) 
use Generic A1 or Generic A2 (at much lower prices). Whether the 
literature calls this an “evergreening” scenario depends on the nature of 
Product B. If Product B contains the same active ingredient (α)—for 
instance, it is a new extended release formulation of α—they will say the 
company has evergreened. If Product B contains a different active 
ingredient in some fashion related to active ingredient α—if it is an 
enantiomer, an active metabolite, or a prodrug, for instance—they will say 
that the company has evergreened. But if Product B contains an active 
ingredient unrelated to α, they will not apply the evergreening label. 
In all three scenarios, beginning in 2020, Innovator enjoys 750 of the 
available 1,000 sales to patients with Disease X at prices that reflect its 
patent protection. But the literature generally holds that in the first two 
scenarios—and not the third—something was extended, lengthened, or 
prolonged in duration.366 Scholars cannot mean the company’s dominance 
in the market for treatment of Disease X has been extended because they 
do not label the third scenario evergreening. They cannot mean the 
company’s dominance in the market for the active ingredient has been 
extended, because the second scenario—an evergreening scenario—does 
not involve that active ingredient. 
These “evergreening” scenarios have two things in common. First, 
there is a relationship between the initial innovation (discovery and 
development of active ingredient α) and the innovator’s new products. 
Although the relationship is hard to describe, the new products stem in 
some fashion from this innovation. They can be attributed in some “but 
for” sense to this initial innovation. Second, the innovator enjoys 
exclusive sales of these but-for products, perhaps at supra-competitive 
(patent-based and perhaps exclusivity-based) prices, even though the 
patent and data exclusivity on the initial innovation—active ingredient 
α—has expired. Taking these two points into account permits precise 
characterization of the extension. It seems the innovator’s ability to charge 
supra-competitive prices for at least some discrete products that can be 
traced to its discovery of active ingredient α (that it would not have been 
366.  Extend, OED, supra note 2, at 4a, 4b. 
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able to introduce if it had not discovered active ingredient α) has lasted 
longer than the patent on α itself.367 
About this, two points should be made. First, the existing empirical 
work suffices to make this claim. It shows that innovators introduce new 
products, the result of incremental innovation, protected by patents and 
exclusivity that expire later than the original protections on its active 
ingredient.368 But it does not tell us more. It tells us nothing about the 
effect of the innovations and product introductions on the market. For 
instance, it does not tell us whether (and how much of) the market shifts 
to the newer products, nor does it tell us—if the market does shift—why 
payers (or prescribers or patients) make the shift. These empirical 
questions could be answered. Second, calling this an extension—and 
therefore using the “evergreen” metaphor—is inherently normative. It is 
normative because there is no basis in current law to state a usual or 
expected length of time during which a company should be permitted to 
market related products at supra-competitive prices. Patent law does not 
provide a basis. It provides a 20-year term for every discrete invention 
claimed. The 20-year term is not meant to cover other inventions that 
would not exist had it not been for the first invention, and there is no basis 
in patent law to deny protection for a discrete invention that meets the 
patenting standards simply because the inventor has already enjoyed a 
patent term on another invention. Nor does FDA law provide a basis for 
stating a usual or expected length of time. 
V. CONCLUSION: A PRELUDE TO POLICYMAKING 
The evergreening metaphor in intellectual property scholarship 
reflects a radical normative claim: a drug innovator should not enjoy 
supra-competitive prices for any products that can be traced to its 
discovery of a new active ingredient after expiry of the patent and data 
exclusivity associated with that active ingredient. But if the underlying 
intuition behind this body of scholarship is that after a fixed period drug 
innovators should simply move on—that they should not enjoy revenue 
 367.  Some articles refer to “evergreening” of orphan exclusivity, which would occur if FDA 
allowed unrelated companies to receive sequential orphan-drug exclusivity terms for the same drug 
for the same disease. See, e.g., Shannon Gibson & Barbara von Tigerstrom, Orphan Drug Incentives 
in the Pharmacogenomic Context: Policy Responses in the U.S. and Canada, 2 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 
263 (2015). Congress amended the statute in 2017 to provide that a company cannot earn orphan-
drug exclusivity if FDA has already approved the same drug for the same disease, unless its drug is 
clinically superior. 21 U.S.C. § 360cc(c) (2018). This effectively precludes the possibility. 
368.  See supra Part III.C. 
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on new products that can be traced back in some fashion to the same new 
chemical entity—that has to be defended. 
Some scholars who use the metaphor hint at normative arguments. 
For instance, they talk about the “rightful” term of a patent, or the notion 
that the public “agreed to pay” for innovation with a 20-year patent term, 
or that after 20 years a “product” belongs in the “public domain.”369 All 
of these things may be true, but these arguments do not defend the claim 
described above. This is why the literature’s failure to grapple with the 
nuanced legal and factual context in which innovators and generic 
companies operate is so pernicious. We would all be better served if 
everyone acknowledged forthrightly that patents are not extended, 
statutory exclusivities are not extended, and generic companies may 
introduce, promote, and sell the active ingredient—so that we can focus 
together on debating the real normative claim. 
Serious policy proposals should be based on rigorous evidence-based 
scholarship that is careful and precise about the law and the facts. 
Policymakers cannot make reasoned and well-informed decisions about 
law and policy in this area if descriptive claims are not rigorously 
supported and carefully assessed and if normative claims are not stated 
clearly and justified. This Article therefore concludes with two 
recommendations for further scholarship on the topic. 
First, descriptive scholarship about “evergreening” should be more 
precise and detailed. Scholars should describe the relevant regulatory, 
 369.  E.g., Ron A. Bouchard, I’m Still Your Baby: Canada’s Continuing Support of U.S. Linkage 
Regulations for Pharmaceuticals, 15 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 71, 117 (2011) (discussing 
prolongation of monopoly “beyond what the public has agreed to pay”); Rebecca S. 
Eisenberg, Pharma’s Nonobvious Problem, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 375, 420 (2008) (suggesting 
that Pfizer’s patent on amlodipine besylate, which expired after the patent on amlodipine, “may have 
seemed like improper patent ‘evergreening’ of a product that had already enjoyed a healthy term of 
patent protection and belonged in the public domain”); Geddes, Sovereign Immunity, supra note 315, 
at 780 (arguing that patentees seek to “extend their statutory monopolies beyond their rightful term”); 
Seymore, Reinvention, supra note 136, at 1068 n.317 (discussing “evergreening” as “an attempt by 
patentees to refresh their expiring patents with new ones by making minor modifications to subject 
matter that should go to the public domain”); Joel Lexchin, Canada’s Patented Medicine Notice of 
Compliance Regulations: Balancing the Scales or Tipping Them?, 11 BMC HEALTH SERVS. RES. 64, 
Mar. 24, 2011, at 2 (describes “evergreening” as “attempts to unfairly extend patent life in order to 
prevent generic competition”); see also Bansal, supra note 172, at 306 (“Enhanced IP scrutiny may 
remove the curse of these unfair practices which are widely followed by the innovator companies to 
create a roadblock for generic companies that are trying hard to provide safe and efficacious medicines 
to the masses at cost effective prices.”); see also Jennifer Robichaux Carter, Comment, Hedge Funds 
Should Be Able to Challenge Patent Validity Using Inter Partes Review Despite Mixed Motives, 54 
HOUS. L. REV. 1315, 1330 n.125 (2017) (mentioning evergreening in a footnote, when discussing the 
proposition that “non-novel patents upset the quid pro quo exchange between the public and patent 
owner and consequently, fail to add any social value”). 
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intellectual property, and state laws thoroughly and precisely.370 We 
should be clear that the various sources of exclusive rights that an 
innovator might enjoy are legally distinct, derive from different bodies of 
law, and have differing scopes and standards. We should be candid about 
what the law currently does and does not require of innovators and generic 
companies. We should be careful when using the term “drug,” given its 
inherent ambiguity, and we should distinguish clearly among approved 
products, describing accurately the scope of approvals as well as the scope 
of associated patents and exclusivity. We should also avoid creating 
inferences that are legally impossible. For instance, we should ensure our 
readers do not infer that a patent claiming a particular innovative 
modification to an earlier approved product claims more than it does. We 
should not refer to patent “extension” unless discussing the extension of 
a particular patent’s term through patent term adjustment 
(35 U.S.C. § 154) or patent term restoration (35 U.S.C. § 156). And we 
should be careful when writing that the PTO issues patents for 
“uninventive” modifications, that it allows multiple patents on the same 
invention, or that it issues patents that are weak, bogus, or 
inappropriate.371 The problem is that non-expert readers may 
 370.  Related to this point, we should distinguish carefully between non-biological drugs (those 
approved under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and discussed in this article) and biological drugs, 
which are licensed under the Public Health Service Act. The regulatory, intellectual property, and 
state law frameworks governing innovative biological medicines and the “biosimilar” and 
“interchangeable” versions marketed on the basis of abbreviated applications differ from the 
frameworks governing non-biological drugs and their generic copies. Policymakers will need to 
distinguish between the two, and scholars should do the same. See generally Erika Lietzan, The 
Uncharted Waters of Competition and Innovation in Biological Medicines, 44 FLA. ST. L. REV. 1 
(2017) (arguing that the scientific, legal, and real world framework in which biologics innovators and 
biosimilar producers will compete differs fundamentally from the framework applicable to small 
molecule drug innovators and their generic competitors); Carrier & Minniti, The New Antitrust 
Frontier, supra note 246 (arguing that various anticompetitive actions will be taken by biologics 
innovators or their biosimilar competitors); Erika Lietzan, A Solution in Search of a Problem at the 
Biologics Frontier, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. ONLINE 19 (responding to Carrier and Minniti, The New 
Antitrust Frontier, supra note 246). 
 371.  E.g., Bouchard, Empirical Analysis, supra note 149, at 182 n.45 (“uninventive” 
modifications); Altin, supra note 207, at 9 (“the filing of ‘secondary patents’, covering related (but 
typically non-innovative) technologies, late in a drug’s base patent life”); Moir, Exploring 
evergreening: Insights, supra note 223, at 424 (“relatively uninventive patents”); Kesselheim, Think 
Globally, supra note 182, at 136 (“Loose interpretation of patents laws has permitted evergreening, 
where overly broad or otherwise inappropriate patents have been granted on peripheral aspects of 
pharmaceutical products, leading to extensions in market exclusivity.”); Gaurav Dwivedi et al., 
Evergreening: A deceptive device in patent rights, 32 TECH. SOC. 324, 326 (2010) (describing 
“evergreening strategies” such as “listing bogus patents in the Orange Book”); Chander & Sunder, 
supra note 159, at 346 (evergreening is “where drug companies seek to extend their patents on weak 
grounds”). In contrast, consider claims that “evergreening” results from mistakes or failures at the 
PTO; these claims can be debated, but they are not legally impossible. E.g., Lemley, Expecting the 
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misunderstand these as undisputed descriptions of fact or of patent law, 
when instead they are argument.372 
Second, we should engage in a robust conversation about the ultimate 
normative claim. Scholars need to own their claim that an innovator 
should not enjoy supra-competitive prices for any products that can be 
traced to its discovery of a new active ingredient after expiry of the patent 
and data exclusivity associated with that active ingredient.373 It is 
conceivable that social welfare is best served by policies that discourage 
drug innovators from introducing more than one finished product 
containing each novel active ingredient and from developing variants of 
that active ingredient. But this normative conversation will be difficult. 
And it should be difficult. It must consider the many subsequent products 
that could be traceable to an initial innovation, the situations in which 
those subsequent products may provide meaningful benefits (clinical or 
otherwise) to patients, whether those products would be developed 
without the protections available after expiry of the initial active 
ingredient patent and data exclusivity, the role we think that consumer and 
physician choice ought to play, and what we think of the information and 
leverage that payers have. And it must grapple with whether drug 
innovators are exceptional (and why) or whether, instead, this rule should 
apply to all inventors. 
Use of the term “evergreening” in scholarship is problematic.374 It is 
a sloppy metaphor that conceals not only descriptive failures but also a 
failure to own and defend a radical—and important—normative claim. 
Serious writers about this topic should avoid the shorthand and focus on 
Unexpected, supra note 133, at 1393 (“While patent law theoretically prohibits ‘double patenting’—
obtaining more than one patent on the same invention—in practice pharmaceutical companies often 
obtain follow-on patents on trivial variants of their basic chemical once the initial patent is about to 
expire.”). 
 372.  Indeed, the Director of the PTO recently testified, in responses to questions about 
“evergreening,” that the PTO applies the same rigorous standards and process to every patent 
application, regardless of the field of technology. Ryan Davis, Iancu Tells Congress One Drug Can 
Deserve Many Patents, LAW360 (May 9, 2019), https://www.law360.com/articles/1156731/iancu-
tells-congress-one-drug-can-deserve-many-patents [https://perma.cc/U959-DHAZ]. 
 373.  Professor Feldman makes the claim by proposing a solution, which she calls “one-and-
done.” See Feldman, May Your Drug Price, supra note 126, at 640–43; see also Robin Feldman, 
“One-and-done” for new drugs could cut patent thickets and boost generic competition, STAT (Feb. 
11, 2019), https://www.statnews.com/2019/02/11/drug-patent-protection-one-done/, 
[https://perma.cc/86T5-PZZQ] (arguing that “one period of protection should be enough” and thus “a 
drug” should “receive just one period of exclusivity, and no more”). 
 374.  Some scholars criticize the term, though they still criticize the underlying scenario. E.g., 
Chaudhry, suprParta note 119, at 206 n.97 (“There is much dissatisfaction with the term 
‘evergreening.’ However, it should not be mistaken for clarity as to patent extension being of no 
importance.”). 
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what matters: an actual description of the law and facts in play and the 
real normative claim being made. The term’s meaninglessness makes it 
impossible for audiences to distinguish among situations that may be 
different, as a legal, theoretical, or normative matter, and that may call for 
differing policy solutions. Using the metaphor does a disservice to 
policymakers and therefore the public. 
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